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ABSTRACT 
 
The U.S. Coast Guard performs a diverse array of missions ensuring the maritime safety and 
security of America as well as the stewardship of her maritime resources.  It efficiently and 
competently performs these missions along America’s coasts, internal federal waters, and 
overseas every day.  Conduct of these missions generates significant public value in the form of 
safe and efficient maritime commerce systems, the security and integrity of our nation’s 
maritime borders, the protection of natural resources, and in lives saved. 
 
This thesis evaluates and, where possible, quantifies the value of Coast Guard services 
performed to enable a strategic comparison, across missions, of services delivered.  This was 
accomplished by researching, evaluating, and consolidating relevant government and industry 
analyses and valuations of Coast Guard services and related services performed by other 
entities.  In addition, this thesis summarizes and evaluates the process used by the Coast Guard 
to develop, communicate, and modify its operational planning to achieve service level goals 
across multiple mission areas. 
 
Thesis Supervisor: John Van Maanen, Erwin H. Schell Professor of Organizational Studies 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
“A few armed vessels, judiciously stationed at the entrances of our ports, might at a small 
expense be made useful sentinels of the laws.” 
Alexander Hamilton, the first Secretary of the Treasury 
Federalist No. 12, The Utility of the Union in Respect to Revenue 
From the New York Packet, 27 November 1787 
 
Alexander Hamilton envisioned a small number of armed vessels, strategically located at major 
trading ports, to enforce customs laws for the fledgling United States of America.  His use of the 
words “few”, “judiciously”, and “small expense” indicated his desire to maximize effectiveness 
in terms of collecting customs duties, thereby ensuring the sovereignty of the new government, 
while limiting federal expenses incurred.  From this small number of armed vessels, the U.S. 
Coast Guard was born. 
As shown in Hamilton’s quote, the concept of maximizing the benefit of government services 
delivered to the nation and its taxpayers is not new.  Today, this balance between public 
benefit and public cost is documented in benefit-cost analyses and tracked through formalized 
program assessments.  But the road to today’s more formalized but admittedly imperfect 
system of checks and balances was anything but smooth. 
The U.S. government’s use of structured cost-benefit analysis can be traced back to the late 
1920’s when the River and Harbors Acts of 1927 and 1928 authorized the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers to estimate the construction costs of proposed projects.  Realizing that cost 
estimates did not reflect the benefit delivered to the taxpayer, Congress passed the Flood 
Control Act of 1936 which specified that public works projects be economically justified 
(Fuguitt, 1999).  The subsequent passage of the 1939 U.S. Reclamation Project Act expanded 
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the requirement to study the benefits of irrigation and water related projects.  From these 
legislations, “cost benefit analyses clearly play an important role in the determination of 
budgets and in the selection of particular projects” (McKean, 1958). 
As post-war expenditures in the 1950’s grew, the need to prioritize and justify budget 
expenditures in defense and health increased.  Determining the monetary value of national 
security and defense objectives proved difficult resulting in the reliance on cost-effectiveness 
analyses that focused on the cost to achieve a stated level of performance or outcome in place 
of an economic benefit (Fuguitt, 1999).  Also during this time, cost-benefit and cost-
effectiveness techniques were applied to health care problems resulting in the then 
controversial practice of assigning a monetary value to a human life or illness.  Many of these 
same concerns persist today (Viscusi, 2006).   
Despite these hurdles, the use of cost-benefit analyses continued to grow in the 1960’s and 
1970’s.  With the U.S economy struggling under the burden of an 11% annual inflation rate in 
1974, President Ford directed agencies to evaluate the economic benefits and burdens of 
proposed rule-makings marking the first required use of cost-benefit analyses (Fuguitt, 1999).  
Despite this economic and administrative impetus, application of cost-benefit principles still 
proved challenging, particularly in the fields of pollution control and environmental regulations.  
The U.S. Clean Air Act of 1970 and 1977 amendments omitted cost-benefit considerations 
which were later corrected with passage of the 1990 U.S. Clean Air Act Amendments (Fuguitt, 
1999). 
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Since President Ford’s directive, several executive orders have been issued and major pieces of 
legislation have been passed requiring further use of cost-benefit analysis and performance 
plans by federal agencies.  In March 1978, President Carter signed Executive Order 12044 which 
required agencies to assess the economic impacts and consequences of proposed regulatory 
actions.  The assessment was to include a “statement of the problem; a description of the 
major alternative ways of dealing with the problem that were considered by the agency; an 
analysis of the economic consequences of each of these alternatives and a detailed explanation 
of the reasons for choosing one alternative over the others."  This regulatory analysis was 
required for regulatory actions having an economic impact of $100 million or more annually, 
would result in significant cost or price increases, or as otherwise selected by agency 
administrators (Carter, 1978).  In 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12291 that 
extended the analysis of regulatory impacts to include those that could adversely impact 
competition, investment, productivity, employment, or the international competitive position 
of the U.S. businesses.  In addition, EO 12291 directed agencies to prioritize on regulatory 
alternatives that maximized net benefits, as allowed for by governing statute. (Reagan, 1981)  
President Clinton later followed suit by issuing Executive Order 12866 on September 30, 1993 
which specified the issuance of regulations whose benefits exceed costs given consideration for 
the overall impact on regulated entities by the proposed and previously existing regulations.  In 
analyzing this Executive Order, Viscusi (2006) concludes that it requires agencies to conduct 
benefit cost analyses and “suggests that they (agencies) explore possible monetization of these 
benefits.” 
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Executive Orders 12044, 12291, and 12866 focused on regulatory actions but not the conduct 
or prioritization of new government projects and acquisitions or use of existing resources and 
equipment.  Echoing the intent of the Flood Control Act of 1936, the Government Performance 
Results Act of 1993 attempted to close this gap by establishing a framework for achieving the 
following: 
 “improve the confidence of the American people in the capability of the Federal Government, by 
systematically holding Federal agencies accountable for achieving program results;  
 initiate program performance reform with a series of pilot projects in setting program goals, 
measuring program performance against those goals, and reporting publicly on their progress;  
 improve Federal program effectiveness and public accountability by promoting a new focus on 
results, service quality, and customer satisfaction;  
 help Federal managers improve service delivery, by requiring that they plan for meeting program 
objectives and by providing them with information about program results and service quality;  
 improve congressional decision making by providing more objective information on achieving 
statutory objectives, and on the relative effectiveness and efficiency of Federal programs and 
spending; and  
 improve internal management of the Federal Government.” 
The most recent update to what is now called “performance based management” of Federal 
agencies was recently issued by President Bush on November 13, 2007 through Executive Order 
13450 entitled “Improving Government Program Performance”.  This executive order requires 
agencies to: 
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 “approve for implementation: 
o clear annual and long-term goals defined by objectively measurable outcomes; and 
o specific plans for achieving the goals, including: 
 assignments to specified agency personnel of: 
 the duties necessary to achieve the goals; and 
 the authority and resources necessary to fulfill such duties; 
 means to measure: 
 progress toward achievement of the goals; and  
 efficiency in use of resources in making that progress; and 
 mechanisms for ensuring continuous accountability of the specified agency 
personnel to the head of the agency for achievement of the goals and efficiency 
in use of resources in achievement of the goals; 
 assist the President… in making recommendations to the Congress… that are justified based on 
objective performance information and accurate estimates of the full costs of achieving the 
annual and long-term goals approved under subsection (a)(i) of this section; and 
 ensure that agency Internet websites available to the public include regularly updated and 
accurate information on the performance of the agency and its programs, in a readily useable 
and searchable form, that sets forth the successes, shortfalls, and challenges of each program 
and describes the agency's efforts to improve the performance of the program.” (Bush, 2007) 
 
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) uses a Program Assessment Rating Tool (PART) 
to assess performance of Federal programs and further performance improvement initiatives.  
The PART “is designed to provide consistent approach to assessing and rating programs across 
the Federal government.” (OMB, 2008) 
 
Executive Order 13450 and OMB’s PART system establish clear requirements for Federal 
agencies to establish annual and long-term performance goals based on objective and 
measurable outcomes.  In this thesis, I will first summarize past research activities conducted by 
government agencies, research institutes and academies, and commercial entities related to 
measurable outcomes for seven of the Coast Guard’s eleven mission areas.  Second, I will 
summarize the process through which the Coast Guard makes strategic and operational 
decisions and communicates those decisions through the chain of command to achieve its 
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stated multi-mission performance goals.  Finally, I will try to identify potential improvements to 
the current decision making and communication process to achieve consistent risk 
management based decisions across multiple mission areas with disparate outcomes.  
This thesis is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 outlines my methodology.  Chapter 3 provides an 
overview of relevant moments in Coast Guard history, the current organizational structure, and 
provides a high-level introduction of the Coast Guard’s eleven mission areas.  Chapter 4 
discusses the key performance metrics and related outcomes for each mission area and 
summarizes relevant research by government agencies, research institutes and academies, and 
commercial entities.  Chapter 5 provides an overview of the strategic guidance and 
organizational doctrine that forms the foundation for strategic and operational decisions within 
the Coast Guard.  Chapter 6 summarizes the Standard Operational Planning Process (SOPP), the 
system of deliberate processes and reports that have been put in place to communicate  
strategic intent and mission emphasis as well as provide crucial mission performance feedback 
throughout the four levels in the Coast Guard’s operational chain of command.  Chapter 7 
concludes this thesis by identifying areas of the Standard Operational Planning Process that 
may challenge its long-term effectiveness in achieving its stated goals. 
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Chapter 2: Methodology 
 
As stated, this thesis will document past research related to measurable Coast Guard mission 
area outcomes and summarize the process through which the Coast Guard makes and 
communicates strategic and operational decisions to achieve its stated multi-mission 
performance goals.  I originally chose these two loosely related topics due to my professional 
interests and personal belief that someday in the future, the Coast Guard, and public policy 
makers in general, would be able to use quantitative techniques to estimate the economic 
value of outcomes to improve their public policy decisions. 
Operating under this premise, my research began with a review of publically available research 
and reports published in professional journals, books, and on the internet by scholars, 
researchers, and government agencies.  To limit the vast quantities of information and general 
commentary available on the array of Coast Guard mission outcomes, I focused my search on 
directly relevant sources; tangentially relevant sources were used only when I was unable to 
locate more direct or pertinent sources.  Due to the politically sensitive nature of some Coast 
Guard mission outcomes (e.g. immigration), I further limited my research to sources that had 
been published or formally presented in public forums (e.g. congressional testimony).  Despite 
this more stringent screening criterion, some source organizations do possess an underlying 
political viewpoint.  In these situations, I have tried to limit referenced information to that 
which is factually based while avoiding reference to politically driven conclusions. 
In addition to the potentially sensitive political issues, the simple act of assigning representative 
economic values to a human life or an endangered animal presents ethical or moral problems.  
13 
 
Public policy outcomes are diverse and include a range of potential outcomes including lives 
saved, national security, environmental sustainability, as well as personal comfort and 
entertainment.  Public policy makers must use limited resources to best meet the sometimes 
competing needs of the nation and, in many situations, the larger global community.  Whether 
we personally agree or not, trade-offs that directly or indirectly equate the relative value of 
diverse public policy outcomes are a necessary part of today’s society.  In light of this fact, this 
thesis focuses on documenting research pertaining to the economic valuation of Coast Guard 
mission area outcomes.  I have refrained from including personal commentary regarding the 
relative scale of the outcome valuations. 
Following my initial research phase that reviewed Coast Guard mission outcomes and planning 
processes, I conducted personal interviews with ten Coast Guard personnel representing 
various aspects of the Coast Guard’s strategic and operational planning processes as well as the 
four levels of the Coast Guard operational chain of command.  At Coast Guard Headquarters, I 
interviewed personnel responsible for the Coast Guard’s strategic, budgetary, and operational 
planning processes.  In addition, I interviewed key resource managers and planning personnel 
at Coast Guard Atlantic Area located in Portsmouth, VA, the First Coast Guard District located in 
Boston, MA, and Coast Guard Sector Boston also located in Boston, MA.  These units were 
chosen for several reasons.  First, they represent a continuous chain of command ranging from 
the policy and budgetary responsibilities of headquarters to the operationally focused Sector 
Boston.  Second, the Atlantic Area and First District offices were identified as lead developers 
and successful implementers of the relatively new “Standard Operational Planning Process.”  
Third, the proximity of Washington, DC and Portsmouth, VA as well as the local access provided 
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by the First District and Sector Boston enabled all interviews to be conducted in person in a 
time and cost efficient manner. 
As the interviews progressed, it became clear that despite the introduction of a standardized 
operational planning process and a staggering amount of operational guidance and priorities, 
all levels in the chain of command lacked information needed to consistently perform mission 
trade-offs.  As this became evident, the focus of my research shifted toward developing a 
potential link between mission outcome valuations and multi-mission tradeoffs at the strategic 
and operational levels of the Coast Guard. 
After changing the focus of this thesis, I updated the title to reflect that despite great efforts, 
this study is not complete.  Inclusion of the words, “A First Look”, suggests that additional work 
remains to identify relevant outcome values for mission areas that I was unable to locate.  In 
addition, I did not attempt to quantify the Coast Guard’s ability to influence desired outcomes, 
whether through preventive programs or response activities.  Lastly, I did not attempt to 
develop efficient or effective strategies to close performance gaps where assets employed or 
regulations enacted may impact multiple mission outcomes simultaneously. 
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Chapter 3: Coast Guard Overview 
A. History1 
 
The U.S. Coast Guard traces its long and proud history as America’s longest continuously 
operating naval force back to the passage of the Tariff Act of 1790.  This act authorized the 
construction of ten small ships, also known as “cutters”, and the establishment of a 100 person 
“Revenue Marine” service to assist in the collection of customs duties.  The Revenue Marine 
was placed within the Treasury Department along with the independent U.S. Lighthouse 
Service, established in 1789 to construct and maintain the nation’s maritime aids to navigation.   
Over the next 73 years, the Revenue Marine was called upon for a variety of mission expanding 
duties.  In 1798 America entered the Quasi-war, an undeclared war fought almost entirely at 
sea, with France.  Having disbanded the Navy following the revolutionary War, America found 
itself without a military naval force.  In 1798 the Revenue Marine was assigned military duties 
which it continued to perform until 1800 as an augmenting force the newly reconstituted Navy.  
Revenue Marine cutters again augmented the Navy’s six frigates in the War of 1812 resulting in 
the first capture of a British war prize at sea.  Following the War of 1812, the Revenue Marine 
also made significant contributions to the African Slave Trade patrols and operations against 
West Indian Pirates during the period 1820 through 1861.  In the early 1830’s, the Revenue 
Marine began limiting general cruising to set aside resources with the intent of providing 
assistance to mariners in distress.  This successful program was later formalized by legislation in 
1837 authorizing public vessels to render air to distressed mariners.  In addition to their 
                                                          
1
 The following accounts of historical events relevant to this thesis were summarized from the Coast Guard 
Publication 1 entitled Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian, 2002. 
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revenue collection and growing rescue duties, the shallow draft Revenue Marine cutters were 
called to service performing coastal naval defense operations during the Seminole War (1836 to 
1839) and the Mexican War (1846-1848). 
During this period, several other federal programs were developing independently of the 
Revenue Marine.  In response to a series of deadly steam vessel explosions, Congress enacted 
legislation in 1838 to improve vessel safety.  This legislation would eventually result in the 
creation of the Steamboat Inspection Service within the Treasury Department.  In addition, the 
U.S. Lifesaving Service was established in 1848 in response to the grounding of the barque 
Terasto and the loss of her crew.  The Revenue Marine and the U.S. Lifesaving Service worked 
closely together providing for the safety of mariners along America’s coasts. 
The Revenue Marine was again called to augment the Navy during the Civil War (1861-1865) 
with the Revenue Cutter “Harriet Lane” being credited with firing the first navel shots of the 
war near Fort Sumter, South Carolina in 1861.  In 1863, the Revenue Marine was renamed the 
Revenue Cutter Service.  When the United States purchased Alaska in 1867, the Revenue Cutter 
Service was dispatched to establish a federal presence by performing a variety of civil, 
humanitarian, and scientific duties. 
In response to lagging training and equipment readiness levels, the Revenue Marine Bureau 
was established in 1871 to overhaul the Revenue Cutter Service.  The Bureau’s success in 
retraining and re-equipping the Revenue Cutter Service resulted in the Bureau being assigned 
similar duties for the Life Saving Service which was transferred as a branch of the Revenue 
Cutter Service.  Following several high profile tragedies in the late 1870’s, Congress passed 
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legislation in 1878 separating the Lifesaving Service from the Revenue Cutter Service and 
authorizing construction of additional shore-based lifesaving stations.  Following this shift, the 
Revenue Cutter Service and Lifesaving Service continued to closely coordinate rescue efforts. 
Legislative actions added several new missions to the Revenue Cutter Service’s repertoire 
during this growth phase in the Revenue Cutter Service’s history.  The Revenue Cutter Service 
was assigned enforcement duties for new federal anchorage regulations (1889), removal of 
derelict hulls (1906), and authority over pleasure boating (1910).  Following the tragic sinking of 
the Titanic in 1912, the Revenue Cutter Service assumed responsibility for ice patrol duties in 
the North Atlantic.  In addition to these new missions, the Revenue Cutter Service continued to 
perform its traditional missions including augmentation of the Navy for the Spanish American 
War in 1898. 
In 1911, President Taft established a special commission to recommend ways to improve the 
efficiency of the federal government.  The commission determined that single purpose agencies 
were more efficient than agencies with multiple functions.  The commission recommended 
dissolution of the multi-functional Revenue Cutter Service and distribution of its functions to 
the Navy and a combined Lifesaving Serve and Lighthouse Service.  The Navy, not wanting to 
take possession of the smaller and lighter cutters and associated missions, objected.  This led to 
the combination of the Revenue Cutter Service and the Lifesaving Service in 1915 to form what 
would become today’s Coast Guard.  In 1939, the Lighthouse Service was added to the Coast 
Guard followed by the Steamboat Inspection Service in 1946.  The aggregation of these four 
agencies and their associated functional responsibilities form the bulk of the mission set of 
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today’s U.S. Coast Guard.  In 1967 the Coast Guard was transferred to the Department of 
Transportation.  In 2003, the Coast Guard was again transferred, this time to the newly created 
Department of Homeland Security with the provision that the service and its multi-mission 
nature, including performance of non-homeland security related missions, would remain intact. 
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B. Organization & Structure 
 
From its humble beginnings of ten small cutters and 100 Revenue Marine personnel responsible 
for enforcing customs laws off select trading ports, the Coast Guard has grown into an 
organization of more than 47,200 full-time civilian and active duty military members, more than 
8,000 part-time or “Reserve” military members, and more than 34,800 volunteer “Auxiliary” 
team members.  These personnel serve in more than 740 units, many of them with fewer than 
30 personnel assigned.  The units are distributed along America’s coasts, interstate lakes and 
rivers, and select foreign locations.  An approximate distribution of Coast Guard shore units is 
presented in Figure 3-1 below. 
 
Figure 3-1 
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Coast Guard units can be further classified, with a few exceptions, into operational and 
administrative/logistics support units.  Operational units include: the Coast Guard’s 251 cutters 
ranging from 65-420 feet in length; 23 air stations operating 211 helicopters and fixed wing 
aircraft; 35 sector offices that perform command and control (C2) as well as some regulatory 
duties; 11 regional commands that perform operational management and command and 
control functions; and 189 small-boat stations, 13 Maritime Safety and Security Teams, 8 Port 
Security Units, and 60 Aids to Navigation Teams that cumulatively operate more than 1,700 
small-boats.  A representative sample of Coast Guard operating platforms and their 
predominant missions is included in Appendix 1. 
The operational chain of command, or the hierarchical organization responsible for the 
management and conduct of the Coast Guard’s operational missions, consists of four levels as 
shown in Figure 3-2 below. 
 
Figure 3-2 
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The operational chain of command is geographically organized to facilitate coordination of 
operations across adjacent areas of responsibility and sharing of response assets.  In 2006, the 
Coast Guard completed the formation of Sectors by combining the functions of the historical 
Group and Marine Safety Office units.  Sectors serve as the consolidated, single point of contact 
for all Coast Guard operations in a given region.  The geographic organization of the Coast 
Guard, reflecting the nine regional District boundaries and the 35 unified Sectors is shown in 
Figure 3-3 below. 
 
Figure 3-3 
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C. Mission Overview  
 
“The U.S. Coast Guard is the principal federal agency charged with maritime Safety, Security 
and Stewardship. As such, the Coast Guard protects vital interests of the U.S. - the personal 
safety and security of our population, our natural and economic resources, and the territorial 
integrity of our maritime borders – from internal and external threats, natural and man-
made... The Coast Guard generates public value through its roles and missions that ensure 
maritime Safety, Security and Stewardship. These roles and missions are enduring, long 
standing responsibilities, accrued to the Coast Guard over two centuries of service because 
they are inherently governmental, serve the collective good, and can be accomplished most 
effectively by a single federal maritime force.” 
 U.S. Coast Guard 
 2008 Budget in Brief and Performance Report 
 
The following is an overview of the Coast Guard’s three broad mission roles and its eleven 
statutorily-mandated missions.  The Coast Guard’s eleven missions are divided into three broad 
roles.  These broad roles are used to track program performance across multiple missions and 
related resource management decisions.  These roles also allow one to think more generally 
about the basic services that a maritime nation requires. 
The first role is that of safety.  This role is focused on saving lives and protecting property.  The 
stated objective for the safety role is to eliminate deaths, injury, and property damage 
associated with maritime transportation, fishing, and recreational boating.  Two missions, 
search and rescue (SAR) and marine safety, fall under the broad mission role of safety. Search 
and rescue and marine safety attempt to achieve the same goal of saving lives and protecting 
property from two different ends of the maritime casualty continuum.  Search and rescue 
focuses efforts on the Coast Guard’s response to mariners in distress while marine safety 
focuses on preventing deaths, injuries, and property loss from occurring. 
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The second major role is security.  The objective for the maritime security role is to establish 
and maintain a secure maritime system while facilitating its use for the national good.  The 
security role includes the missions of ports, waterways, and coastal security (PWCS), illegal drug 
interdiction, undocumented migrant interdiction, defense readiness, and other law 
enforcement activities.  The security mission role seeks to protect the nation by preventing 
illegal or malicious activities from exploiting our nation’s vast maritime boundaries.  The PWCS 
mission goal is to deter, detect, prevent and respond to attacks against U. S. territory, 
population, and critical maritime infrastructure.  The illegal drug interdiction mission seeks to 
halt the flow of illegal drugs into the United States by maritime routes.  The undocumented 
migrant interdiction mission’s goal is to interdict undocumented migrants at sea, denying them 
entry via maritime routes to the United States, its territories and possessions.  The goal of 
defense operations is to defend the nation as one of the five U.S. armed services and enhance 
regional stability in support of the National Security Strategy, using the Coast Guard’s unique 
and relevant maritime capabilities.  And finally, the goal of other law enforcement activities is 
to prevent and interdict other illegal incursions into the U.S. maritime territories including 
foreign encroachment of the U.S. exclusive economic zone which is shown in Figure 3-4. 
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Source: Coast Guard Publication 1 
Figure 3-4 
 
Complementing the Coast Guard’s maritime security role, the Coast Guard also performs a 
substantial stewardship role.  Here, the Coast Guard seeks to maximize the effectiveness and 
sustainability of the nation’s maritime environs.  With the goal of managing the sustainable and 
effective use of the nation’s inland, coastal, and ocean waters and resources for the future 
national good, the stewardship role includes the following four missions: marine environmental 
protection, protection of living marine resources, aids to navigation, and ice operations.  The 
marine environmental protection mission seeks to eliminate environmental damage and the 
degradation of natural resources associated with maritime transportation, fishing, and 
recreational boating.  The living marine resources mission seeks to enforce domestic fisheries 
law to ensure the sustainability of fish stocks.  The goal of the aids to navigation and ice 
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operations missions is to facilitate maritime commerce and eliminate interruptions and 
impediments to the efficient and economical movement of goods and people, while maximizing 
recreational access to and enjoyment of the water. 
The relationship between the Coast Guard’s safety, security, and stewardship roles and the 
associated eleven missions is shown in Figure 3-5 below. 
Safety Security Stewardship 
Saving Lives & Protecting 
Property 
Establishing & Maintaining a Secure 
Maritime System while Facilitating 
its Use for the National Good 
Managing the Sustainable & Effective 
Use of its Inland, Coastal, and Ocean 
Waters & Resources for the Future 
Search and Rescue  
Marine Safety 
Ports, Waterways & Coastal Security 
Illegal Drug Interdiction 
Undocumented Migrant Interdiction 
Defense Readiness 
Other Law Enforcement 
Marine Environmental Protection 
Living Marine Resources 
Aids to Navigation 
Ice Operations 
Source: USCG 2008 Budget in Brief and Performance Report 
Figure 3-5 
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D. Mission Performance Goals, Targets, & Outcomes 
“The Coast Guard’s multi-mission character is defined by its ability to conduct distinct yet 
complementary functions in the maritime domain—law enforcement, national defense, 
maritime mobility, maritime safety, environmental protection, and humanitarian response. 
This unique character positions the Coast Guard to meet a broad range of national interests 
within the maritime domain. The Coast Guard secures the nation’s vast maritime border while 
ensuring the safe and efficient transportation of people and goods. It protects the marine 
environment and guards natural resources. It defends our nation at home and abroad 
alongside the other Armed Services. And it saves the lives of those in distress, both at sea and 
ashore.” 
 U.S. Coast Guard 
 2008 Budget in Brief and Performance Report 
 
 
The Coast Guard performs its eleven statutorily-mandated missions with a wide array of multi-
mission assets including aircrafts, ships, boats, and command centers.  It communicates its 
desired “mission balance” to operational commanders, Congress, and eventually the American 
public through explicitly stated performance goals and target levels of performance for each 
mission.  Table 3-1 summarizes the Coast Guard’s performance goals and target levels of 
performance for fiscal year 2007 for its eleven missions.  In addition, the fundamental outcome 
unit is listed. 
Since these missions are performed using many of the same or similar assets, how does one 
apportion, or plan to distribute, those assets to achieve the targeted level of performance?  
How does one compare the benefit to the American public of improving the percentage of 
mariners saved versus improving the compliance rate on fishing vessels (which would 
presumably improve the long-term sustainability of fish stocks)? 
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Mission 
Role Mission Performance Goal 
Performance 
Target 
(FY07) 
Fundamental 
Outcome 
Unit 
Sa
fe
ty
 
Search and 
Rescue 
Save mariners in imminent danger on our 
nation’s oceans and waterways. 
86% of 
mariners saved 
Life 
Marine Safety Eliminate maritime fatalities and injuries on 
our nation’s oceans and waterways. 
4,721 or fewer 
fatalities or 
injuries 
Life & injury 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
Ports, 
Waterways, 
and Coastal 
Security 
Reduce homeland security risk in the 
maritime domain. 
15% reduction 
in risk 
Risk of terrorist 
attack 
Illegal Drug 
Interdiction 
Increase the removal rate of cocaine.  The 
percentage of the non-commercial maritime 
flow of cocaine to the U.S. seized, jettisoned, 
abandoned, or otherwise destroyed. 
26% removal 
rate 
Kilogram of 
cocaine 
Undocumented 
Migrant 
Interdiction 
Increase the interdiction rate of illegal 
migrants (all nationalities) attempting to enter 
the U.S. via maritime means. 
67% 
interdiction 
rate 
Un-
documented 
migrant 
Defense 
Readiness 
Support our national security and military 
strategies by ensuring assets are at the level 
of readiness required by the Combatant 
Commander. 
100% readiness Unit readiness 
level 
Other Law 
Enforcement 
Reduce the number of vessel incursions into 
the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
199 or fewer 
incursions 
Vessel incursion 
St
ew
ar
d
sh
ip
 
Marine 
Environment-al 
Protection 
Eliminate oil spills and chemical discharge 
incidents > 100 gallons. 
19 or fewer oil 
spills & 
chemical 
discharges 
Oil spill, 
chemical 
discharge 
Living Marine 
Resources 
Increase the observed compliance rate of 
domestic fishing vessels. 
97% observed 
compliance 
rate 
Compliance 
rate 
Aids to 
Navigation 
Eliminate collisions, allisions, and groundings 
by vessels on our nation’s oceans and 
waterways. 
1,664 or fewer 
collisions, 
allisions, & 
groundings 
Collisions, 
allisions, 
groundings 
Ice Operations Maintain operational channels for navigation, 
limiting channel closures. 
Less than 2 
days during 
average 
winters, 8 days 
during severe 
winters 
Channel closure 
days 
Table 3-1 
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The reader should note that performance targets for some missions are absolute, e.g. “199 or 
fewer EEZ incursions”, while performance targets for other missions are proportional to an 
unknown future threat, e.g. “save 86% of mariners in distress”.  These differences exist for a 
number of reasons including the certainty of size of future risk populations, how the Coast 
Guard apportions and positions assets to perform missions, as well as a variety of other 
relatively unknown, and possibly unknowable, organizational biases and interests.  The purpose 
of this thesis, however, is not to evaluate the performance goals and their related targets, but 
probe deeper into the mechanisms and processes used to conduct trade-offs in a multi-mission 
organization.  For this task, the performance goals and related performance targets are of 
secondary importance.  The key piece of information to be examined here is the fundamental 
outcome unit and its value to society. 
The Coast Guard’s challenge of trading off performance between eleven distinct but 
complementary missions is but a small subset of the public policy challenges that occur at the 
federal, state, and local levels.  To address this challenge, governmental agencies have 
attempted to monetize the benefits (or outcomes) of public policy decisions in order to 
maximize the overall benefit delivered to the public.  As outlined in Chapter 1, numerous 
federal acts and executive orders require federal agencies to perform benefit cost analyses 
before enacting major public policy decisions.  The advantages of monetizing benefits are best 
stated by Viscusi (2006: pg 1) as follows: 
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“From an economic standpoint, the advantages of monetizing benefits are quite strong because 
establishing this kind of metric makes it much easier to compare benefits with costs and make 
choices across various policy alternatives.  Because society’s resources are limited, ultimately we 
must be making choices such as these across different policy domains.  To assess which 
regulatory interventions make sense and which do not, it is essential to have a scorecard by 
which it is feasible to make such comparisons.  Monetization also has an additional practical 
benefit in a world of regulatory impact analysis.  Costs are quantifiable in dollar terms, as are 
many benefit components, so failing to place a monetary value on seemingly intangible benefits 
such as environmental amenities may lead to inadequate attention to intangible benefits in the 
policy choice process. Monetizing these benefits puts them on equal footing with benefits that 
are perceived to have real economic value because they can be quantified in dollar terms.” 
 
Monetizing the benefit of eliminating a vessel grounding or preventing a kilogram of cocaine 
from entering the country for public consumption is difficult but trying to do so is 
understandable.  Benefits, whether they consist of avoiding damage to a ship or general 
increases in worker productivity and reductions in public health care and law enforcement 
costs, are tangible and logically limited in scale.  Yet the question remains: How does one 
monetize the value of a human life or preventing an endangered species from becoming 
extinct?  Viscusi (2006) reasons that in order for something to be “priceless,” it must have 
infinite economic value.  If this were true, then “if saving the snail darter is priceless, no amount 
of monetary cost should be spared in preserving these birds even if it depletes the entire GDP.” 
(Viscusi 2006: pg 2) 
One does not need to go to the extreme of the previous example to conclude that there are no 
“priceless” benefits of public policy.  Temporarily setting aside the concept of benefit 
monetization, the fact that the government simultaneously regulates activities resulting in a 
myriad of public benefits indicates that these benefits have bounded relative value.  If this were 
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not the case, government should attempt to regulate activities to achieve the single most 
valuable benefit before pursuing any other. 
Public policy benefits can be monetized using a number of different techniques that attempt to 
quantify the opportunity cost for valuing both benefits and costs.  The two most prevalent 
techniques are willingness-to-pay (WTP) and willingness-to-accept (WTA).  Willingness-to-pay 
techniques measure what individuals are willing to forgo to enjoy a benefit (e.g. pay to prevent 
something undesirable from happening) while willingness-to-accept techniques attempt to 
determine how much compensation individuals would be willing to accept for not receiving a 
potential benefit.  In general, economists and government entities favor willingness-to-pay as 
the preferred measure of opportunity cost although willingness-to-accept valuations may be 
valid in some circumstances (OMB A-4 2003). 
Some may feel that relative benefit valuation techniques are more ethically and morally 
acceptable than absolute monetization of benefits.  This may be true.  However, once a 
monetary value is assigned to any public policy benefit, the monetary valuations for all benefits 
could then be derived.  For these reasons, I have chosen to research monetary valuations of 
Coast Guard mission outcomes. 
Due to the period of time over which research has been performed on various mission 
outcomes, it is important to identify the time basis for each monetary estimate of public value.  
I have employed the practice of identifying the reference year for monetary estimates by listing 
the reference year immediately followed by a dollar sign in parenthesis following monetary 
estimates.  For example, if a study found that a loaf of bread cost one dollar in 2005, the value 
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would be listed as $1 (2005$).  At the conclusion of Chapter 4, monetary benefits for each Coast 
Guard mission area will be summarized and calculated with applicable adjustments for inflation 
to reflect equivalent values in 2007 thereby enabling direct cross-mission comparison. 
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Chapter 4: Coast Guard Mission Outcome Valuations 
 
“I conceive that the great part of the miseries of mankind are brought upon them by false 
estimates they have made of the value of things.” 
Benjamin Franklin, “The Whistle”, 1779 
The broad roles and associated missions will be discussed using the same structure and order of 
presentation as discussed in Chapter 3.  This chapter is divided into three sections reflecting the 
Coast Guard’s mission roles of safety, security, and stewardship.  Each of these three sections is 
then broken down into sub-sections reflecting the Coast Guard’s eleven mission areas. 
A. Safety 
 
The Coast Guard’s safety role traces its historical roots back to the heroic rescue and assistance 
efforts of the early lighthouse keepers, the use of Revenue Marine cutters to assist distressed 
mariners, the creation of the U.S. Lifesaving Service, and the efforts of the Steamboat 
Inspection Service.  The Coast Guard seeks to prevent injuries and the loss of life through a 
comprehensive program of preventative and response based actions.  Preventative actions 
include enacting and enforcing safety regulations, inspecting vessel construction to ensure 
compliance with accepted industry standards and regulations, and monitoring and regulating 
marine events.  Despite these preventive measures, mariners often require assistance or 
rescue.  The Coast Guard responds to mariners in distress with a fleet of multi-mission ships, 
boats, and aircraft as well as the ability to request and coordinate rescue efforts by other 
government agencies and individual mariners that may be available to respond. 
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1. Search and Rescue 
 
“…there is a great deal of debate about the appropriate value (of a statistical life), and no 
single dollar figure has been uniformly accepted by the academic community or within the 
Federal government.” 
Federal Highway Administration Memorandum, 1994 
 
 
Performance Goal: Save mariners in imminent danger on our nation’s oceans and 
waterways. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Human life 
Before beginning the summary of research related to the monetization value of a human life, it 
is important to note that I have cited research to only those efforts that focus on monetizing 
the value of a statistical life (VSL) and not the value of any single or specific individual.  This 
qualification is important since society’s willingness-to-pay would likely vary considerably 
depending on the individual in question, whether they be the President of the United States, a 
famous celebrity, a young girl stuck in a well, a convicted murderer, or a homeless person who 
has all but vanished from society’s view.  The value of a statistical life estimates society’s 
“willingness-to-pay” to reduce the risk of death over a given population.   
To demonstrate the value of a statistical life, consider the following scenario.  Assume you live 
in a city with a population of one million people.  The mayor announces that one random 
citizen will die from a preventable accident.  How much are citizens willing to pay to eliminate 
this known risk?  If the population on average indicates it is willing to pay $5 per individual to 
eliminate the risk, then the resulting value of a statistical life is $5 million.   
Viscusi (2006) notes that there are two primary means to estimate the value of a statistical life.  
Estimates can be made by surveying a representative sample of the target population.  The 
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second and preferred method is to estimate the value of a statistical life by analyzing actual 
market data that result from public policy decisions.  Market data is preferred to survey data 
because it reflects actual public policy decisions versus stated responses to a hypothetical 
situation. 
Several studies have documented the value of a statistical life based on actual public policy 
decisions.  Government and academic studies have documented a wide range of implied values 
of statistical life.  In 1981, the Government Accounting Office conducted a survey of federal 
agencies and noted: “Our survey of a number of Government agencies with responsibility for 
health and safety regulation indicates that they have little in common in how they assign dollar 
values to premature death, injury, or illness.”  The report went on to summarize its findings 
that included “Cost per Life Saved” values ranging from $72 thousand for kidney transplants to 
$4.5 million for jet plane ejector seats to greater than $158 million for OSHA coke oven 
emissions standards. (GAO 1981)  
One of the most comprehensive and respected studies was completed by Viscusi and Aldy 
(2003) which compared the value of statistical life based on 16 regulatory decisions completed 
by U.S. agencies between 1985 and 2000.  The resulting analyses revealed an average value of 
statistical life of $3.8 million (2000$) with a range of $1M -$6.3M million.   
The first question to be asked is: “Are all values of statistical life the same?”  The academic 
literature indicates they are not.  Sunstein (2004) asserts that value of statistical life estimates 
can be further broken down based on the target population’s wealth, gender, race, age, 
nationality and income level (and presumably job type).  Viscusi and Aldy (2003) support the 
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development of more targeted valuations of statistical life estimates and argue such measures 
should be a priority for the research community and government agencies.  They suggest that 
improved estimates could result in better government interventions to address environmental, 
health, and safety risks.  Research supports the concept of adapting the value of statistical life 
estimates for target populations based on age, income, and nationality (Aldy and Viscusi 2003, 
Viscusi 2006). 
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) have also found that the value of statistical life decreases with age once 
an individual passes prime working years.  More specifically, the value of statistical life 
estimates for individuals in their early 60’s is 30-40 percent lower than the average for the 
general population and 50-66% less than that of prime aged workers (Viscusi and Aldy 2003).  
One common alternative to estimating value of statistical life based on age is to divide the value 
of statistical life for a prime aged worker by the estimated years of life resulting in a value per 
life, per year.  This approach should be treated with caution because it assumes all remaining 
years of life are of equal value (Viscusi 2006). 
Research also supports varying estimates of the value of statistical life based on income level, 
and, by derivation, nationality.  More specifically, Viscusi estimated changes in income level to 
have a 0.5 to 0.6 elastic effect on value of statistical life estimates.  For example, a 20% increase 
in income results in a 10-12% increase in estimated value of statistical life values (Viscusi 2006).  
As a result, workers in developing countries “have significant, but smaller, values of statistical 
life” consistent with relative income level elasticity. (Viscusi and Aldy 2003: pg 63) 
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While research supports the existence of different value of statistical life estimates, is it “fair” 
to those populations who have a lower value of statistical life?  Addressing the moral 
implications of different estimates is beyond the scope of this thesis; however, Sunstein 
presents an interesting perspective on the ethical aspects of income based value of statistical 
life estimates: 
“With respect to persons, the argument is more controversial, above all because it treats 
poor people as less valuable (literally) than rich people. But at least at first glance, 
differences are appropriate here as well. The reason is not that poor people are less 
valuable than rich people. It is that no one, rich or poor, should be forced to pay more 
than they are willing to pay for the reduction of risks. This idea embodies a norm of 
equality. And if poor people are unwilling to pay much for the reduction of serious risks, 
the appropriate response is not a compelled purchase, but a subsidy.”  (Sunstein 2004: 
pg 29) 
Sunstein (2004) supports the individualization of risk reduction measurement and notes that 
while it is impossible to implement from a regulatory perspective, every person should be given 
regulatory risk protection commiserate with their personal willingness-to-pay criteria.  The idea 
that individuals self-select an equivalent value of statistical life based on their individual risk 
decisions has potentially profound impacts on public policy. 
Consider the research of Ashenfelter and Greenstone (2003) who estimated the value of 
statistical life based on a population’s actual risk trade-off decisions in a voluntary setting.  They 
evaluated the benefits and costs associated with driving speed in states that raised highway 
speed limits.  Based on the 21 states that were able to provide complete data, the increased 
driving speeds resulted in approximately 125,000 transit hours saved for every life lost.  
Applying average hourly wage rates, this results in a savings of approximately $1.54 million 
(1997$) per fatality.  The interesting aspect of this research, however, is that it represents a 
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rare opportunity to base the value of statistical life estimates on the public’s voluntary behavior 
(e.g. whether to drive faster) in light of a known safety risk.  Whether an individual truly 
understands the incremental change in risk associated with increasing their driving speed by a 
few miles per hour can be debated.  However, this approach is interesting since it is contrasted 
against other public policy decisions where a remote third party is enacting regulations on 
disparate population segments (e.g. air travelers versus construction site workers).  Ashenfelter 
and Greenstone (2003: pg 2) concluded: 
“Speed limit regulations, however, provide benefits (reduced travel time) and costs 
(fatality risk) to precisely the same people, so that appeals to a simple model of the 
typical voter are far more plausible in this context.” 
 
How should public policy address the fact that some individuals are willing to undertake 
behaviors with known safety risks?  This question has implications for the Coast Guard.  First, 
the fishing profession, for example, is routinely cited as one of the most dangerous occupations 
in the world.  The Coast Guard regulates certain aspects of the fishing industry and responds to 
save fishermen in distress.  Similarly, should the Coast Guard account for individual risk 
behaviors including extreme sports (e.g. powerboat racing, kite surfing), endurance events (e.g. 
solo circumnavigation of the world, transoceanic rowing attempts), individuals who disregard 
regulations (e.g. carrying too few personal floatation devices), and undertake questionable risk 
taking behavior (e.g. transiting during inclement conditions or weather)? 
The Environmental Protection Agency identified that value of statistical life studies often do not 
fully reflect consumer costs to reduce risks or account for related benefits incidental to taking 
an averting action.  As a result, consumer market studies may underestimate value of statistical 
life estimates (EPA 2000).   This factor becomes especially important for populations that 
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undertake actions that have a perceived level of heightened risk as individual risk mitigation 
actions could play an even greater role. 
As indicated earlier in this chapter, there exists a range of value of statistical life estimates.  
Viscusi and Aldy (2003) concluded that while estimates vary across studies, the consensus value 
of statistical life for “prime-aged workers has a median value of about $7 million in the United 
States.”  From the public policy side, the Environmental Protection Agency, the source agency 
for many costly federal regulations, has published a guide specifically addressing the proper 
conduct of benefit-cost analyses in a regulatory setting.  Based on its evaluation of 26 different 
value of statistical life studies, the guide recommends use of $4.8 million (1990$), updated to 
the base year of the analysis, as a value of statistical life estimate (EPA 2000).  The Federal 
Aviation Administration recommends use of $3 million (2001$) as a value of statistical life (GRA 
2007) which is consistent with its parent department, the Department of Transportation, which 
recommends use of $3 million (2001$)  (DOT 2002).  Contrary to DOT guidance, the Federal 
Highways Administration used a value of statistical life value of $3.5 million (2001$) in its 
benefit analysis of proposed tire pressure measurement system regulations (DOT 2005).  In 
September 2007, the Bureau of Customs and Border Protection issued a proposed rulemaking 
citing benefit cost analyses using two different value of statistical life estimates, $3 million and 
$6 million (Federal Register 72:180).  In contrast, the Office of National Drug Control Policy 
estimated the mortality losses associated with drug-related deaths.  The losses, which were 
discounted to account for lost lifetime market and household productivity, averaged $1 million 
per death (ONDCP 2004). 
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Determination of the value of statistical life estimate for Coast Guard use is a policy decision 
that should be coordinated within the Department of Homeland Security.  Given its extensive 
history on studying the value of statistical life, the Environmental Protection Agency appears to 
be the lead federal agency in statistical life estimations for public policy use.  In addition, the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s transparency in how their value of statistical life estimates 
are developed and applied adds credibility and confidence to their use.  Therefore, the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s value of statistical life estimate of $4.8 M (1990$), updated 
to the base year of analysis, should be the default value used for future public policy decisions.  
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2. Marine Safety 
 
“The injuries we do and those we suffer are seldom weighed in the same scales” 
Aesop 620-560BC 
 
Performance Goal: Eliminate maritime fatalities and injuries on our nation’s oceans and 
waterways. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Human life, human injury 
 
Given the development of value of statistical life estimates, this section focuses on the 
economic valuations associated with preventing human injuries.  The concept of the value of 
statistical injury closely follows the concept of value of statistical life with the primary focus 
being on the loss of economic utility.  One of the most referenced studies on value of statistical 
injury was completed by Miller, Luchter, and Brinkman (1989) which based cost per injury on 
widely accepted abbreviated injury scale (AIS) criteria as summarized in Table 4-1.  The 
maximum AIS (MAIS) level represents the highest injury level for victims receiving multiple 
injuries.  
Table 4-1: Cost Per Injury Based on Maximum AIS Severity 
Severity Description 
Cost per Injury 
(1986$) 
MAIS6 Fatality $2,000,000 
MAIS5 Critical $1,525,000 
MAIS4 Severe $375,000 
MAIS3 Serious $115,000 
MAIS2 Moderate $36,000 
MAIS1 Minor $4,000 
The values represent expected loss of economic utility only.  In addition, Miller (1989) noted 
that treatment costs combined with the associated loss of utility may result in economic costs 
for some debilitating injuries that exceed the value of statistical life.  For example, a MAIS 5 
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burn may result in $3.6 million (1986$) in treatment costs and loss of economic utility; MAIS 5 
disabling head injury $3.2 million, MAIS 5 quadriplegia $2.6 million, MAIS 4 disabling head 
injury $2.9 million, and MAIS 4 quadriplegia $2.2 million (Miller 1989).  One particularly difficult 
aspect of monetizing statistical injuries is that large percentages of the general population 
participate in activities that are detrimental to their own health which can then be used to 
estimate their personal attitudes toward risk.  Specifically, Viscusi (2006) found that smokers 
exhibit behaviors that reflect an implicit value of $20,000 per statistical injury versus $39,000 
for people who don’t smoke prompting the question of how public policy should account for 
differing valuations based on demonstrated risk tolerances and behaviors. 
Use of value of statistical injury estimates by government agencies has a long history.  In 1981, 
the Department of Transportation issued guidelines specifying the average monetary value for 
injuries for use in regulatory evaluations.  Critical injuries (survival uncertain) were assigned a 
value of $230,000, severe injuries (life threatening, survival probable) $102,000, moderate 
injuries $68,000, and minor injuries $3,400 (1981$) (DOT 1981). 
Citing the work performed by Miller, Luchter, and Brinkman (1989), the Department of 
Transportation updated its guidance and issued “comprehensive costs” based on the 
abbreviated injury scale.  Despite the use of the word “comprehensive” and a definition that 
“comprehensive costs” include medical treatment, the estimates below do not reflect Miller’s 
findings that value of statistical injury for some situations can exceed the value of statistical life. 
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Table 4-2: Comprehensive Costs per Injury (DOT Tech Advisory, 1994) 
Severity Descriptor 
Comprehensive Cost 
per Injury (1994$) 
MAIS6 Fatality $2,600,000 
MAIS5 Critical $1,980,000 
MAIS4 Severe $490,000 
MAIS3 Serious $150,000 
MAIS2 Moderate $40,000 
MAIS1 Minor $5,000 
 
In its 2005 benefit cost analysis on Tire Pressure Monitoring Systems, the Federal Highways 
Administration used the following equivalency scale for estimating the value of statistical 
injuries relative to the value of statistical life estimates. 
Table 4-3: Relative Value per Injury (DOT TPMS, 2005) 
Severity Description 
Relative Value per 
Injury (2000$) 
MAIS6 Fatality 1.000 
MAIS5 Critical 0.7124 
MAIS4 Severe 0.2153 
MAIS3 Serious 0.0916 
MAIS2 Moderate 0.0458 
MAIS1 Minor 0.0031 
 
The ability to link injury levels to the statistical value of life is desirable from a public policy 
standpoint.  This structure allows for consistent and repeatable calculation of benefit values for 
scenarios in which a mixture of fatalities and injuries are possible.  In situations where statistical 
value of life estimates are developed for a specific population, the use of relative injury values 
allows for a consistent application of relative value of injuries. 
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B. Security 
 
“Any society that would give up a little liberty to gain a little security will deserve neither and 
lose both.” 
Benjamin Franklin, 1706-1790 
 
The United States has more than 19,000 miles of land and maritime borders. Securing the more 
than 12,000 miles of maritime borders, which consists of over 95,000 miles of shoreline, is 
further complicated by the presence of more than 300 relatively open ports and a high level of 
commercial maritime and recreational boating traffic.  In recent years, the United States has 
improved security of its air, land, and maritime borders.  However, the maritime border’s size 
makes it a more attractive point of entry as the nation increases air and land border security.  
Balanced security across all three border regimes is necessary to improve the nation’s overall 
security.  
The overarching goal of the security mission role is to establish and maintain a secure maritime 
system while facilitating its use for the national good.  The Coast Guard breaks the overarching 
security mission role into the following five mission areas: Ports, Waterways, and Coastal 
Security, Illegal Drug Interdiction, Undocumented Migrant Interdiction, Defense Readiness, and 
Other Law Enforcement.   
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1. Ports, Waterways, and Coastal Security 
 
 “We will bankrupt ourselves in the vain search for absolute security.” 
Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1890-1969 
 
Performance Goal: Reduce homeland security risk in the maritime domain. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Risk of terrorist attack 
 
Due to the complexities of monetizing the economic value of national security and relative risk 
of attack, I was unable to locate many references to take up this challenging problem.  The 
PWCS mission is a trade-off.  On one hand, approximately 95 percent of all U.S. overseas trade 
moves by water (Loy 1999) and contributes more than $700 billion per year to the national 
economy (U.S. Commission Ocean Policy 2004).  This volume requires an extremely efficient 
transportation system. 
Transportation delays can prove costly.  Jones (2005) estimated the economic costs of delaying 
the container ship CSAV RIO PUELO, carrying 1,084 containers of cargo including five containers 
of Argentine lemons, for six days.  An anonymous source alleged that the lemon shipment may 
contain a hazardous biological agent.  The resulting commercial delays, response efforts, and 
loss of perishable cargo totaled more than $1.5 million.  No biological agent was found.  If this 
scenario were played out at the port level (i.e. the entire port gets shut-down), the potential 
economic costs grow substantially.  The Congressional Budget Office estimates that a one week 
closure of the port of Los Angeles/Long Beach would result in approximately $450 million, or 
the equivalent of $65 million per day, in cargo delay costs alone (Congressional Budget Office 
2006).  This figure does not include any costs associated with response, investigation, or 
mitigation actions.  Homan and Steiner (2007) estimated that policy changes resulting in a 4 
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hour increase in shipping time for containerized cargo would result in a $117.3 million decrease 
in U.S. gross domestic product while a similar increase in shipping times in the ports of Los 
Angeles/Long Beach would reduce U.S. gross domestic product by $58.9 million.  These costs 
are balanced by potentially devastating costs that would be associated with a successful 
terrorist attack in the maritime domain.  Volpe (1991: Vol III Exhibit 3.1) estimated that 
estimated that the economic impact of a liquefied natural gas release resulting from a ship 
collision in Everett, Massachusetts could result in over 3,500 fatalities and property damage 
exceeding $230 million (1990$). 
The largest challenge associated with estimating the economic benefits of Coast Guard PWCS 
mission outcomes does not lie in estimating the economic impacts associated with various 
action alternatives.  The more challenging aspect is to quantify the Coast Guard’s ability to 
influence the actual risk, and more specifically, the intent and capability of would-be attackers.  
I was unable to locate work done in this domain. 
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2. Illegal Drug Interdiction 
 
Performance Goal: Increase the removal rate of cocaine.  The percentage of the non-
commercial maritime flow of cocaine to the U.S. seized, jettisoned, abandoned, or 
otherwise destroyed. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Kilogram of cocaine 
 
Stemming the use of illegal drugs in the United States requires a balanced strategy of 
prevention, treatment, interdiction, and law enforcement.  This section is limited to the 
examination of interdiction efforts in the maritime domain. 
The Coast Guard is designated as the lead federal agency for maritime drug interdiction.  It also 
shares lead responsibility for air interdiction with the U.S. Customs Service. Currently, the Coast 
Guard focuses its effort on stopping the flow of cocaine as it is the primary illegal drug destined 
for the United States conveyed via the maritime domain.  The Coast Guard's mission is to 
reduce the supply of drugs by removing cocaine as it is transported through in the Transit Zone, 
a six million square mile area, including the Caribbean, Gulf of Mexico and Eastern Pacific.  
The Office of National Drug Control Policy completed a report in 2002 that estimated the 
economic costs of illicit drug use including the associated law enforcement costs.  The report 
did not include costs related to abuse of legal substances (e.g., alcohol, tobacco, and 
prescription medications).  The report found that illegal drug use cost the U.S. an estimated 
$180.9 billion in 2002.  These costs were distributed between lost productivity (71% - $128.6 
billion), health care (9% - $15.8 billion), and other (20% - $36.4 billion); (ONDCP 2002).  
Productivity losses include losses due to premature death, drug-related illnesses, 
47 
 
hospitalization, incarceration, and crime related activities.  As shown in Table 4-4, illegal drug 
use is one of the three most costly health problems facing the U.S. (ONDCP 2002). 
Table 4-4: Comparison of Costs of Major Health Problems in US 
(Costs in billions of estimate year dollars) 
 
The largest component of the productivity loss results from criminal activity, including lost 
productivity attributable to the more than 660,000 offenders incarcerated for drug-related 
crimes (ONDCP 2002).  In addition, there were an estimated 23,500 drug-related deaths (e.g., 
overdose, poisoning, homicide, HIV and hepatitis B/C due to drug related needle sharing) in 
2000.  Taking into account other associated enforcement and corrections efforts, an estimated 
one million person years of effort could have been available for economically productive 
activities were it not for illegal drug use and related criminal activities (ONDCP 2002).  When 
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crime-related lost productivity, health care, and other costs are aggregated, the total economic 
impact of drug-related crime is $107.8 billion per year. 
One challenging aspect of the ONDCP’s report is that it does not break out economic costs by 
illegal drug type.  In order to estimate the economic value associated with cocaine use, a 
method to disaggregate the economic costs of illegal drug use must be developed.  One 
possible method is to estimate the percentage of cost associated with various drug types based 
on an underlying cost driver.  Two possible approaches would be to use the perceived 
seriousness of the drug threat and relative drug-related arrest rates.  A survey of local and state 
agencies identified the following percentages for greatest drug threat: methamphetamine 35%, 
cocaine 40%, marijuana 12%, heroin 8%, and pharmaceuticals 5% (Dept of Justice NDIC 2007). 
Since crime-related costs account for a large percentage of economic costs, drug-specific arrest 
rates could also be used to estimate a disaggregated cost.  In 2002, there were 33,692 drug 
arrests for federal offenses; 37% for cocaine, 22% for marijuana, 13% for methamphetamine, 
6% for heroin, and 22% for other drugs (Dept of Justice 2004).  Looking beyond federal 
offenses, in 2002 there were an estimated 1,535,800 arrests for drug law violations at the 
federal, state, and local levels in the U.S.  Of these, the break-down between drug types were 
as follows: 30% for cocaine and heroin, 45% for marijuana, 5% for synthetic drugs, 20% for 
other (Dept of Justice 2004).  Assuming a similar ratio of cocaine versus heroin arrests at the 
federal level, this would result in the following estimated break-down for drug law arrests at 
the federal, state, and local level: 26% for cocaine, 45% for marijuana, 4% for heroin, 5% for 
synthetic, and 20% for other.  Arguably, the social economic costs of a cocaine arrest are 
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greater than that of a marijuana arrest so estimating cocaine’s contribution to the overall drug-
related costs at 26% should be conservative. 
Combining the relative arrest rate and perceived drug threat rates results in cocaine accounting 
for an estimated 26-40% of the U.S. drug related economic costs, or $47-72.4 billion (2002$).  
Since an estimate of street availability of cocaine in 2002 was not publically available, an 
estimate of street availability for 2001 will be used.  Given an estimated 265 metric tons of 
cocaine were available for retail sale in U.S. in 2001 (Dept of Justice 2002), the average 
economic impact of keeping one kilogram of cocaine from being consumed, whether through 
prevention, treatment, or enforcement, is approximately $177,000-$273,000, with an average 
value of $225,000 per kilogram (2002$). 
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3. Undocumented Migrant Interdiction 
"Give me your tired, your poor, 
Your huddled masses yearning to breathe free, 
The wretched refuse of your teeming shore. 
Send these, the homeless, tempest-tost to me, 
I lift my lamp beside the golden door!"  
Emma Lazarus, The New Colossus, 1883 
 
 
Performance Goal: Increase the interdiction rate of illegal migrants (all nationalities) 
attempting to enter the U.S. via maritime means. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Undocumented migrant 
 
The United States is predominately a nation of immigrants.  Our borders have never been 
completely open or closed with respect to immigration resulting in strong polarization of beliefs 
on how best to address immigration and related public policies.  As a law enforcement agency, 
the Coast Guard’s assigned role is to enforce immigration laws at sea.  At-sea interdiction 
efforts prevent the loss of life by intercepting migrant vessels that are often dangerously 
overloaded, enable timely return of undocumented migrants to their country of origin, and 
support the nation’s legal migration system. 
Like many public policies, the United States’ immigration policy has evolved and changed over 
time.  In 1965, passage of the Immigration and Naturalization Act replaced immigration quotas 
based on national original with a system that favored family unification and certain 
occupational skills.  This law resulted in a shift in overall immigration demographics, increasing 
immigration rates from Latin America and Pacific Rim countries while decreasing immigration 
from Western European countries (Smith and Edmonston 1997). The Immigration Reform and 
Control Act of 1986 mandated employer verification of legal immigration status but created 
new legal status termed “alien lawfully admitted for temporary residence” to account for illegal 
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immigrants who could prove long-term and continuous residence in the United States (Smith 
and Edmonston 1997).  Partially offsetting this shift in immigration policy, the Personal 
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 restricted noncitizen legal 
immigrants from receiving access to select public programs (Smith and Edmonston 1997). 
The ebb and flow of public policy combined with the future prospects of a globalized economy 
fueled research into the economic value of immigration.  Vernez and McCarthy conducted an 
analysis of immigration studies and found, not surprisingly, that immigration studies often had 
inconsistent findings.  The benefits of immigrants ranged from an annual cost of $1,400 per 
immigrant to an annual benefit of $1,600 per immigrant (Vernez and McCarthy 1996).  This 
range of economic values was due in part to differing definitions of who is an immigrant, 
unavailability of data, different treatment of public services consumed and benefits derived, 
and the overall lack of a consistent accounting framework (Vernez and McCarthy 1996).  With 
regard to defining who is an immigrant and who is not, all studies included foreign born non-
citizens but often treated naturalized immigrants and children of immigrants, both legal and 
illegal, differently.  In addition, they found that most studies included public services provided 
to individuals (e.g. education, medical, social services) but did not account for more general 
economic costs and benefits (e.g. national defense, interest on the national debt).  Likewise, 
studies generally included benefits derived from individuals (e.g. income, property and sales 
tax), but excluded more general sources of revenue (e.g. business and corporate revenues and 
taxes).  They also found that often immigrants are net consumers of public services, not 
because of their immigration status, but because of their generally low income levels (Vernez 
and McCarthy 1996).  Given this bias towards income level versus immigration status plus the 
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fact that economic values vary with age and employment, Vernez and McCarthy recommend 
that economic impacts be measured over the duration of an immigrant’s residence and that 
policy debates be focused on selectivity of admission based on long-term costs and benefits. 
One comprehensive study that tried to address the shortcomings of previous works was 
completed by the National Research Council in 1997.  This study, entitled The New Americans: 
Economic, Demographic, and Fiscal Effects of Immigration, evaluated the economic impacts of 
immigrants; it did not differentiate between legal and illegal immigrants.  It also looked at the 
overarching economic impacts of immigration.  One such impact was that immigration acts like 
international trade to dissolve the rigid link between domestic production and consumption 
(Smith and Edmonston 1997).  As a result, residents with higher skill and capital levels benefit 
from immigrant labor while domestic workers with skills comparable to immigrants experience 
reduced wages from labor competition.  When trade becomes more open, which it has in the 
10 years since the study was completed, the negative wage effects that immigrants have on 
domestic workers becomes less severe (Smith and Edmonston 1997).  The study also found that 
all segments of society benefit when immigrant labor performs jobs that would otherwise go 
unfilled. 
With regard to specific economic impacts, New Americans found the overall economic benefit 
from immigration is $1.1-9.5 billion annually; however, the benefits and costs are not 
distributed equally throughout the country.  States or localities of immigrant residence bearing 
the bulk of the fiscal burden with non-residency states experiencing a net economic benefit 
(Smith and Edmonston 1997). 
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The two primary determinants of economic contribution are educational level and age with 
education level playing the predominant role.  In general, the higher an immigrant’s education 
level, the greater their economic contribution.  For individual immigrants (i.e. not counting the 
economic contributions of their descendents), the economic impact for immigrants with less 
than a high school education is -$89,000, with a high school education -$31,000, with a greater 
than high school education $105,000 resulting in an average economic impact of -$3,000 per 
immigrant (Smith and Edmonston 1997).  If the economic impacts of future generations are 
included, the economic impact for immigrants with less than a high school education is -
$13,000, with a high school education $51,000, with a greater than high school education 
$198,000 resulting in a average economic impact of $80,000 per immigrant and future 
descendents (Smith and Edmonston 1997).  It should be noted that the New Americans study 
included economic contributions of future generations spanning 300 years, the duration of 
which is highlighted by the study’s detractors (Camarota and Bouvier 1999). 
Expanding the evaluation to include age, economic contributions are greatest for immigrants at 
or just before their prime wage earning years.  Older immigrants generally consume services at 
a higher rate without offsetting contributions during their prime wage earning years.  The fiscal 
impacts for an individual immigrant are positive for those with greater than high school 
education up to their late 40’s, for those with a high school education a positive impact is 
experienced up to their mid 30’s, and for those with less than a high school education a positive 
impacts is experienced up to their mid 20’s (Smith and Edmonston 1997). 
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Taking average education level and age of entry into account, the net effect of immigration 
from Latin America is negative while immigration from Canada and Europe is positive.  The fact 
that most immigrants arrive at a relatively young working age reduces the net negative impacts 
of Latin American immigrants (Smith and Edmonston 1997). 
Given this construct, I will now focus on the current scale of illegal immigration in the United 
States.  Government agencies have recently updated their terminology to reflect today’s illegal 
immigration situation.  The term “unauthorized migrant” is now used to describe foreign 
citizens residing in the United States illegally and includes immigrants who enter the country 
without proper approval and immigrants who violate the terms of their temporary admission 
program (CBO 2007).  The Department of Homeland Security estimated that 11.6 million 
unauthorized migrants were residing in the United States as of January 2006 (DHS 2007). 
Given this large unauthorized migrant population, it is valuable to better understand their 
demographics.  Approximately 80% of unauthorized migrants originate from Latin American 
countries with the remainder almost equally split between Asian countries and the rest of the 
world (Passel 2005).  In addition, unauthorized migrants, as a general population, are much 
younger than the average United States’ resident and legal immigrant population.  
Approximately 84% of working age (18-64 years old) unauthorized migrants are younger than 
age 45 compared to approximately 60% of native and legal immigrants (Passel 2005).  
Educationally, unauthorized migrants lag both legal immigrants and the native population.  
Approximately 49% of unauthorized migrants lack a high school education, compared to 25% of 
legal immigrants and 9% of the native population.  Conversely, 25% of unauthorized migrants 
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are educated beyond the high school level compared to 50% of legal immigrants and 59% of the 
native population.  These differences in education level are reflected in average family income 
estimates.  In 2004, unauthorized migrants earned an average of $27,400 per family which was 
57% of the average family income earned by legal immigrants and native families (Passel 2005). 
The fact that unauthorized migrants possess differing economic impacts based on education 
level and age has several public policy implications.  Should immigration policies be further 
adapted to allow, or even encourage, immigration by persons with advanced education?  
Should enforcement efforts target undocumented migrants originating from countries with 
lower educational levels?  Or does national sovereignty, through control of our borders, 
outweigh any differences in economic impacts of unauthorized migrants from one country 
versus another?  Regardless of the answer to these policy questions, the use of economic 
impact estimates to quantify the overall value of enforcement efforts appears valid.  More 
accurate economic impacts can be developed by tying economic impact to unauthorized 
migrants’ education level; -$89,000 for unauthorized migrants with less than a high school 
education, -$31,000 for those with a high school education, and $105,000 for those possessing 
advanced education (1999$).  Applying the demographic educational profiles for unauthorized 
migrants reported by the Pew Institute, the average economic impact of an unauthorized 
migrant is -$25,410 (1999$).  Restated in a manner more consistent with other mission 
performance outcomes, the public service benefit of interdicting an unauthorized migrant is 
$25,410 (1999$). 
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4. Defense Readiness 
 
Performance Goal: Support our national security and military strategies by ensuring 
assets are at the level of readiness required by the Combatant Commander. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Unit readiness level 
 
The outcome value of the Coast Guard’s defense readiness mission could be quantified by 
estimating the equivalent life-cycle costs required for the Department of Defense to perform 
defense related activities and capabilities currently assigned to the Coast Guard.  This benefit 
would need to be offset by the Coast Guard’s reduced performance of non-defense missions 
while actively supporting Combatant Commanders as well as any additional costs associated 
with maintaining defense readiness in excess of that required for non-defense missions.  
Unfortunately, I was unable to locate any references in the public domain that estimated these 
economic values. 
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5. Other Law Enforcement 
 
Performance Goal: Reduce the number of vessel incursions into the U.S. Exclusive 
Economic Zone. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Vessel incursion 
 
The U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone is the largest in the world, containing 3.4 million square miles 
of ocean and 90,000 miles of coastline.  While the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone protects the 
U.S. claim to all resources located within the zone including minerals, vegetation, and animals, 
the majority of vessel incursions occur for the taking of fishery resources.  The Magnuson-
Stevens Fisheries Conservation and Management Act (MSFCMA) of 1976 extended U.S. fisheries 
management authority out to the full 200 miles authorized by international law.  The three 
most frequent threats to the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone occur near the maritime boundary 
with the former Soviet Union west of Alaska, the border with Mexico in the Gulf of Mexico, and 
along the international boundary with Canada in the Great Lakes.  Unfortunately, no studies 
assessing the economic costs associated with vessel incursions of the U.S. Exclusive Economic 
Zone were located. 
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C. Stewardship 
The same challenges of scope and breadth of area of responsibility that apply to safety and 
security missions also apply to the Coast Guard’s stewardship role.  The Coast Guard’s 
stewardship role is defined as managing and sustaining the effective use of its inland, coastal, 
and ocean waters and resources for the future.  It includes a variety of mission areas ranging 
from environmental protection, to aids to navigation, to ice operations, each enabling the 
nation to make best use of its present and future maritime resources. 
1. Marine Environmental Protection 
 
Performance Goal: Eliminate oil spills and chemical discharge incidents >100 gallons. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Oil spill, chemical discharge 
 
Estimating ecological benefits is a complex science that must incorporate benefits derived from 
direct and indirect market and non-market impacts.  Due to the resulting complexity of the 
problem, economic impacts are often estimated for individual ecological benefits then summed 
rather than estimating the overall benefit or replacement cost for an ecosystem (EPA 2000). 
The Coast Guard seeks to accomplish its goal of eliminating oil spills and chemical discharges, 
and minimizing the damage resulting from incidents that do occur, through a combined 
program of regulatory actions, facility inspections, and timely response to reported incidents.  
Regardless of the cause of an oil spill or chemical discharge, the economic impact remains.  
Several studies have attempted to estimate the economic impact of oil spills and chemical 
discharges.  In fact, the economic impact of an oil spill or chemical discharge is highly 
dependent on a number of variables including the geographic location, the type of material 
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spilled, the size of the spill, the distance from shore or sensitive habitats, as well as the 
effectiveness of recovery and clean-up efforts. 
Before discussing the economic value of preventing oil spills and chemical discharges from 
occurring, it is important to determine whether regulatory actions can influence the occurrence 
of incidents.  Grau and Groves (1997) concluded that while Coast Guard enforcement efforts 
decreased both the frequency and size of oil spills, the threat of penalty fines had no 
appreciable impact in the frequency or size of oil spills.  In addition, Grau and Groves found that 
use of a performance measurement system did improve the effectiveness of Coast Guard 
actions (1997). 
Several studies assessed the economic impacts or costs associated with a limited number of 
cost categories that could result from an oil spill or chemical discharge in the marine 
environment.  An extensive study completed by the Volpe National Transportation Systems 
Center estimated the economic costs associated with the reduction of maritime accidents as 
part of a benefit-cost study for the expansion of vessel traffic management systems (i.e. similar 
to air traffic control but for large commercial shipping in busy ports).  A subset of the economic 
impacts associated with maritime accidents was potential environmental damage resulting 
from spilled oil or chemical discharge.  The Port Needs Study (Vessel Traffic Services Benefits) 
estimated the economic costs associated with natural resource losses, recreation and tourism 
losses, affected property value losses, cleanup costs, economic losses of subsistent populations, 
and environmental damage assessment costs (Volpe 1991).  The study estimated economic 
impacts of additional factors including vessel repair costs, cost of idled vessels, commodity 
60 
 
losses, and fatalities and injuries which are not discussed in this section due their independence 
from environmental damage costs. 
Volpe (1991) estimated economic impacts resulting from natural resource losses by applying 
the Natural Resource Damage Assessment Model for Coastal and Marine Environments 
(NRDAM/CME) developed by the U.S. Department of the Interior.  Spill scenarios were run for 
three different spills sizes small (0-10,000 gal), medium (10,000-100,000 gal), large (100,000-
750,000) with loss estimates for catastrophic spills (+750,000 gal) extrapolated from model 
results for a large spill.  These spill categories were then modeled using spills sizes of 8,000 gal, 
90,000 gal, 500,000 gal, and 4,000,000 gal, respectively.  Since the environmental impacts are 
geographically dependent and reflect animal species specific to the locale, economic impacts 
are listed by major port.  In addition, the type and toxicity of prevalent cargos must also be 
factored in to reflect expected damages.  Table 4-5 lists the economic impacts resulting from 
natural resource losses by major port for prevalent cargos transported through that port. 
  
61 
 
Table 4-5: Natural Resource Loss per Spill for Prevalent Commodities  
Shipped thru Port (1990$) 
Port 
Small 
(8K gal) 
Medium 
(90K gal) 
Large 
(500K gal) 
Catastrophic 
(4M gal) 
01-Boston $7,950  $109,300  $599,700  $4,797,500  
02-Puget Sound $19,357  $223,321  $1,702,786  $13,622,286  
03-Los Angeles/Long Beach $42,000  $281,125  $1,372,875  $10,983,000  
04-Santa Barbara $37,500  $473,000  $3,048,500  $24,388,000  
05-Port Arthur $352,250  $3,562,550  $21,265,150  $141,637,600  
06-New Orleans $237,083  $4,005,667  $22,511,292  $180,090,333  
07-Houston/Galveston $1,028,235  $8,388,765  $32,696,353  $173,209,176  
08-Chesapeake Bay $7,833  $96,278  $572,556  $4,580,444  
09-Baltimore $15,700  $1,963,300  $29,968,500  $266,748,000  
10-Corpus Christi $34,000  $445,625  $13,455,563  $107,644,500  
11-New York $42,227  $503,818  $3,209,864  $25,678,909  
12-Long Island Sound $35,933  $320,267  $1,479,867  $9,918,933  
13-Philadelphia $33,895  $386,474  $2,230,789  $17,846,316  
14-San Francisco $37,333  $569,400  $3,865,467  $30,923,733  
15-Portland OR $30,286  $289,929  $1,582,286  $12,658,286  
16-Cook Inlet $78,273  $257,545  $841,000  $6,728,000  
17-Portland ME $13,667  $148,500  $835,167  $6,681,333  
18-Portsmouth $9,833  $90,750  $499,583  $3,996,667  
19-Providence $48,250  $928,375  $10,297,500  $82,380,000  
20-Wilmington $198,250  $2,114,083  $8,351,667  $66,813,333  
21-Jacksonville $34,000  $471,667  $2,994,000  $23,952,000  
22-Tampa $40,333  $322,111  $1,557,778  $12,462,222  
23-Mobile $192,842  $4,272,000  $32,367,158  $258,937,263  
Average $128,257  $1,511,209  $9,438,652  $70,109,150  
Values derived from data contained in Port Needs Study (Volpe Vol III 1991: Table 6-3) 
The environmental impact results can further be summarized according to commodity type.  
Natural resource losses by commodity type, averaged across the 23 ports studied, are shown in 
Table 4-6. 
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Table 4-6: Natural Resource Loss per Commodity Type Spill (1990$) 
Commodity 
Small 
(8K gal) 
Medium 
(90K gal) 
Large 
(500K gal) 
Catastrophic 
(4M gal) 
1311-(crude) $31,673 $219,855 $1,072,273 $8,578,182 
2810-(sodium hydroxide) $6,000 $227,000 $1,748,000 $13,984,000 
2813-(alcohol) $1,996,727 $17,726,091 $67,504,273 $351,865,091 
2817-(benzene, toluene) $137,167 $1,191,500 $4,896,167 $38,836,000 
2911-(gasoline) $114,642 $2,413,481 $20,917,049 $167,336,864 
2912-(jet fuel) $10,714 $86,143 $947,286 $46,149,714 
2913-(kerosene) $2,111 $24,778 $165,333 $1,322,667 
2914-(#2 fuel oil) $94,372 $1,082,000 $7,365,705 $58,556,410 
2915-(#6 fuel oil) $24,411 $187,822 $982,033 $7,856,267 
Average $128,257 $1,511,209 $9,438,652 $70,109,150 
Values derived from data contained in Port Needs Study (Volpe Vol III 1991: Table 6-3 
The economic impacts to recreation and tourism losses resulting from a petroleum spill are 
listed in Table 4-7.  In addition to recreation and tourism losses, economic impacts to property 
values were also estimated and are listed in Table 4-8. 
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Table 4-7: Losses to Recreation & Tourism Due to 
Releases of Petroleum and Petroleum Products 
(1990$ per Barrel Reaching Shore) 
 Table 4-8: Lost Property Value Due to Releases of 
Petroleum and Petroleum Products  
(1990$ per Barrel Reaching Shore) 
Port Petroleum 
Petroleum 
Product  Port Petroleum 
Petroleum 
Product 
Boston $213 $160  Boston $614 $460 
Puget Sound $341 $255  Puget Sound $2,104 $1,578 
Los Angeles $2,524 $1,892  Los Angeles $10,522 $7,891 
Santa Barbara $2,788 $2,091  Santa Barbara $10,522 $7,891 
Port Arthur $678 $509  Port Arthur $140 $105 
New Orleans $678 $509  New Orleans $70 $53 
Houston/Galveston $678 $509  Houston/Galveston $526 $395 
Chesapeake Bay $1,008 $755  Chesapeake Bay $701 $526 
Baltimore $1,008 $755  Baltimore $701 $526 
Corpus Christi $678 $509  Corpus Christi $701 $526 
New York $213 $160  New York $614 $460 
Long Island Sound $213 $160  Long Island Sound $1,228 $921 
Philadelphia $1,008 $755  Philadelphia $701 $526 
San Francisco $461 $346  San Francisco $1,403 $1,052 
Portland OR $341 $255  Portland OR $2,104 $1,578 
Cook Inlet $3 $2  Cook Inlet $140 $105 
Portland ME $213 $160  Portland ME $701 $526 
Portsmouth $213 $160  Portsmouth $701 $526 
Providence $213 $160  Providence $1,228 $921 
Wilmington $593 $444  Wilmington $526 $395 
Jacksonville $593 $444  Jacksonville $526 $395 
Tampa $421 $316  Tampa $2,104 $1,578 
Mobile $253 $190  Mobile $526 $395 
Average $667 $500  Average $1,700 $1,275 
 Data obtained from Port Needs Study  Data obtained from Port Needs Study 
 (Volpe Vol III 1991: Table 6-4) (Volpe Vol III 1991: Table 6-5) 
 
The economic impact estimates resulting from recreation and tourism losses and property 
value losses are based on the amount of petroleum product that lands on shore.  Table 4-9 
provides point estimates for percent of oil products spilled that reach shore.  This value is highly 
dependent on prevailing weather conditions. 
  
64 
 
Table 4-9: Percent of Spilled Oil and Oil Product Reaching Shore 
Commodity Code Commodity Name Percent 
1311 Crude Oil 60% 
2811 Petroleum Product 15% 
2817 Benzene, Toulene 10% 
2911 Gasoline 10% 
2912 Jet Fuel 35% 
2913 Kerosene 35% 
2914 Distillate Fuel Oil 45% 
2915 Residual Fuel Oil 70% 
Data obtained from Port Needs Study (Volpe Vol III 1991: Table 6-6) 
The information contained in Tables 4-7 through 4-9 can be combined to estimate the 
combined recreation, tourism, and property value losses associated with a petroleum spill, as 
shown in Table 4-10. 
Table 4-10: Estimated Recreation, Tourism, and Property Value Losses for  
Petroleum Spill by Port (1990$) 
Port 
Small 
(8K gal) 
Medium 
(90K gal) 
Large 
(500K gal) 
Catastrophic 
(4M gal) 
01-Boston $72,175 $811,964 $4,510,909 $36,087,273 
02-Puget Sound $213,382 $2,400,545 $13,336,364 $106,690,909 
03-Los Angeles/Long Beach $1,138,560 $12,808,800 $71,160,000 $569,280,000 
04-Santa Barbara $1,161,600 $13,068,000 $72,600,000 $580,800,000 
05-Port Arthur $71,389 $803,127 $4,461,818 $35,694,545 
06-New Orleans $65,280 $734,400 $4,080,000 $32,640,000 
07-Houston/Galveston $105,076 $1,182,109 $6,567,273 $52,538,182 
08-Chesapeake Bay $149,149 $1,677,927 $9,321,818 $74,574,545 
09-Baltimore $149,149 $1,677,927 $9,321,818 $74,574,545 
10-Corpus Christi $120,349 $1,353,927 $7,521,818 $60,174,545 
11-New York $72,175 $811,964 $4,510,909 $36,087,273 
12-Long Island Sound $125,760 $1,414,800 $7,860,000 $62,880,000 
13-Philadelphia $149,149 $1,677,927 $9,321,818 $74,574,545 
14-San Francisco $162,676 $1,830,109 $10,167,273 $81,338,182 
15-Portland OR $213,382 $2,400,545 $13,336,364 $106,690,909 
16-Cook Inlet $12,480 $140,400 $780,000 $6,240,000 
17-Portland ME $79,767 $897,382 $4,985,455 $39,883,636 
18-Portsmouth $79,767 $897,382 $4,985,455 $39,883,636 
19-Providence $125,760 $1,414,800 $7,860,000 $62,880,000 
20-Wilmington $97,658 $1,098,655 $6,103,636 $48,829,091 
21-Jacksonville $97,658 $1,098,655 $6,103,636 $48,829,091 
22-Tampa $220,364 $2,479,091 $13,772,727 $110,181,818 
23-Mobile $67,985 $764,836 $4,249,091 $33,992,727 
Average $206,552 $2,323,708 $12,909,486 $103,275,889 
Values derived from data contained in Port Needs Study (Volpe Vol III 1991: Tables 6-3 through 6-6) 
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Volpe (Vol III 1991) provides an estimated range of costs associated with petroleum spill clean-
up costs as shown in Table 4-11.  The upper limit of 95% confidence interval was felt to most 
accurately reflect recent (circa 1990) cleanup costs. 
Table 4-11: Cleanup Costs By Spill Size (1990$) 
Spill Size 
(gal) Cleanup Cost 
68% Confidence 
Interval 
95% Confidence 
Interval 
8K $80,000 (20K; 315K) (5K; 1,239K) 
90K $46,000 (117K; 1,811K) (30K; 7,132K) 
500K $1,590,000 (404K; 6,261K) (103K; 24,650K) 
4M $7,154,000 (1,817K; 28,167K) (461K; 110,901K) 
Values derived from data contained in Port Needs Study (Volpe Vol III 1991: Table 6-8) 
Due to the range of estimated cleanup costs contained in Table 4-11, the Volpe estimates are 
quite subjective.  Fortunately, subsequent studies that focused specifically on cleanup costs 
have been completed.  Etkin (2000) found that oil spill cleanup response costs are contingent 
on a number of factors including location, oil type, spill size, and cleanup strategy.  Differences 
in prevailing cultural values, socio-economic costs, and labor costs are also reflected in oil spill 
cleanup costs resulting in significantly higher cleanup costs in the United States.  Other factors, 
such as spill location, oil type, and spill size, also drive spill cleanup costs.  Etkin (2000) also 
found that near-shore spills are 4-5 times as costly to cleanup as offshore spills and heavy fuels 
are more than 10 times as costly to cleanup as lighter fuels. 
Etkin (2004) estimated oil spill response costs based on the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
Basic Oil Spill Cost Estimation Model (BOSCEM).  Specific multiplier factors can be applied to 
reflect cleanup costs by oil type, shoreline type (e.g. rocky versus sandy), and cleanup method 
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used (e.g. mechanical, dispersants, In Situ burning).  Estimated marine crude oil spill response 
costs using mechanical recovery are provided in Table 4-12 below. 
Table 4-12: Per-Unit Marine Oil Spill 
Response Costs in the US (2003$) 
Spill Size (gal) 
Response Costs 
($/gal) 
0-500 $199 
500-1,000 $197 
1,000-10,000 $195 
10,000-100,000 $185 
100,000-1,000,000 $118 
>1,000,000 $82 
Data derived from Etkin (2004: Table 1) 
As shown in the data above, larger spills are less expensive to cleanup on a per-unit basis due to 
one-time equipment and personnel mobilization and set-up costs.  Converting the cleanup 
costs to equivalent size spills estimated in the Volpe Port Needs Study results in the oil spill 
cleanup costs are contained in Table 4-13. 
Table 4-13: Estimated Oil Spill Cleanup Costs 
(2003$) 
Small (8K gal) $1,560,000 
Medium (90K gal) $16,650,000 
Large (500K gal) $59,000,000 
Catastrophic (4M gal) $328,000,000 
 
Sometimes large oil spills and chemical discharges can directly impact the ability of local 
subsistence families to provide for themselves.  Table 4-14 summarizes additional economic 
costs associated with subsistence losses. 
Table 4-14: Subsistence Losses Resulting 
from Spill of Petroleum (1990$) 
Small (8,000 gal) $0 
Medium (90,000 gal) $5,100 
Large (500,000 gal) $12,300 
Catastrophic (4,000,000 gal) $6,109,200 
Data obtained from Volpe (Vol III 1991: Table 6-9) 
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Additional economic costs are incurred to conduct environmental damage assessments 
following an oil spill or chemical discharge.  Table 4-15 summarizes environmental damage 
assessment costs for oil spills. 
Table 4-15: Environmental Damage 
Assessment Costs Resulting from Petroleum 
Spill (1990$) 
Small (8,000 gal) $0 
Medium (90,000 gal) $15,000 
Large (500,000 gal) $3,000,000 
Catastrophic (4,000,000 gal) $15,000,000 
Data obtained from Volpe (Vol III 1991: Table 6-10) 
In total, the economic costs represented in Tables 4-6 through 4-15 can be aggregated to 
estimate economic impacts associated with oil spills of various sizes as listed in Table 4-16; cost 
data is reported in 2003 dollars using standard adjustments for inflation. 
Table 4-16: Average Economic Costs Resulting from 
Petroleum Spill (2003$) 
Small (8,000 gal) $2,031,000 
Medium (90,000 gal) $22,070,000 
Large (500,000 gal) $94,685,000 
Catastrophic (4,000,000 gal) $593,208,000 
 
Economic costs associated with chemical discharges will vary depending on the attributes of the 
chemical discharged.  To account for cost impacts associated with oil or chemical spills in 
specific locations, one should use the Environmental Protection Agency’s Basic Oil Spill Cost 
Estimation Model (BOSCEM) to estimate costs associated with specific spill scenarios in those 
locations. 
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2. Living Marine Resources 
 
Performance Goal: Increase the observed compliance rate of domestic fishing vessels. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Compliance rate 
 
The Coast Guard’s role in ensuring the sustainability of U.S. fisheries is the result of a complex 
relationship between government regulators, regional management councils consisting of 
government and industry representatives, and the commercial fishing industry.  This set of 
relationships is further complicated by differing enforcement capabilities and legal jurisdictions 
of the various agencies involved.  This relationship was best characterized in a study completed 
by the Center for Naval Analysis: 
“The USCG is one component of a complex national management structure for fishery 
resources.  The Coast Guard remains the only agency with both the authority and ability 
to maintain an enforcement presence over the whole EEZ.  NOAA, which sets overall 
policy, prosecutes enforcement cases initiated by the USCG, and performs shore-side 
enforcement of fisheries regulations. Regional fisheries management councils (RFMCs), 
who set quotas and formulate regulations for individual fisheries. Individual states, 
through involvement via Joint Enforcement Agreements to assist enforcement in federal 
fisheries. The Department of State, international regional fisheries management 
organizations (RFMOs), and other nations.  In its fisheries enforcement mission, the 
USCG enforces regulations it does not write, leading to resolutions it does not control 
using data it does not hold. “ (Filadelfo et al 2006) 
As a result of this complex relationship, the Coast Guard measures its performance on the 
compliance rate observed onboard domestic fishing vessels.   
It is clear that the fishing industry has a positive economic value.  In 2006, U.S. consumers spent 
approximately $69.5 billion on fishery related products and services (NMFS 2007).  The 
recreational saltwater fishing industry alone is estimated to be worth $20 billion (Filadelfo et al 
2006).  It is estimated that commercial fisheries contribute more than $35 billion in value to the 
U.S. gross national product each year (NMFS 2007) and this contribution comes from fishery 
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stocks that are producing at about 60 percent of their long-term potential yield (USCG Ocean 
Guardian 2004).  Unfortunately, I was unable to locate any studies that linked observed 
compliance levels to the economic value of sustaining the U.S. fishery stocks. 
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3. Aids to Navigation 
 
Performance Goal: Eliminate collisions, allisions, and groundings by vessels on our 
nation’s oceans and waterways. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Collisions, allisions, and groundings 
 
The United States is a maritime nation.  Our economy relies heavily on the safe and efficient 
interstate transport and international import and export of raw materials and finished 
products.  This reliance on maritime trade is carried out by the approximately 700 ships that 
arrive in U.S. ports each day to transport cargo that contributes more than $700 billion per year 
the U.S. economy (CG Strategy 2007).  Despite higher waterway congestion and the 
introduction of larger and faster ships, the worldwide average vessel loss rate has declined 
from 3% in 1900, to 0.5% in 1960, and to 0.25% in 2000 (Kristiansen 2005).  Some of this 
decrease is attributable to improved vessel construction and accident avoidance technologies, 
but also the introduction and improvements in vessel navigational services. 
The goal of the Coast Guard’s Aids to Navigation mission is to eliminate vessel collisions, 
allisions (i.e. collisions with a stationary structure), and groundings.  The Coast Guard 
accomplishes this mission with a range of navigational services including short range (i.e. visual) 
aids to navigation, vessel traffic management services, and long-range (i.e. electronic) aids to 
navigation.  The presence of these three categories of systems cumulatively reduces the risks 
associated with navigating in open-ocean, coastal, and port environments.  
Short-range navigational aids include lighthouses, buoys, day markers, and fog signals that help 
mariners pilot in coastal and port environments.  The reference markers assist mariners in 
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determining their position and warning mariners of maritime hazards such as shallow water or 
submerged wrecks.  The Coast Guard maintains approximately 50,000 short range aids to 
navigation with a similar number being maintained by private entities. (Bureau Transportation 
Statistics 1999). 
The Coast Guard operates two long distance electronic navigational aids, the LORAN-C system 
and the Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS).  LORAN-C provides positioning 
information with a 0.25 mile absolute accuracy.  Since the mid-1990’s, use of satellite based 
global positioning services (GPS) and satellite based with terrestrial reference stations, 
differential global positioning services (DGPS) have become more widespread.  DGPS enables 
ships with special receivers to determine their position with 5-10 meter accuracy, compared 
with 100 meters for standard positioning systems.  This difference in capability is very 
important considering that some channels used by large vessels are less than 100 meters wide.  
DGPS’s highly precise positioning capabilities combined with advanced electronic charting 
systems enable vessels to more safely navigate in restricted waterways. 
In addition to short and long range aids to navigation, the Coast Guard operates Vessel Traffic 
Services in select ports.  Vessel Traffic Services increase the quality and timeliness of 
information a mariner needs to navigate their vessel safely.  Information, including the location 
and intentions of other vessels, aid to navigation discrepancies, hazards to navigation, and local 
weather reports, are passed to vessels participating in the service. In addition, Vessel Traffic 
Services will alert vessel operators of specific hazards to navigation or collision threats and 
recommend a course of action to avoid the hazard or threat.  Vessel operators voluntarily act 
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on VTS recommendations in most situations.  In situations where a vessel ignores the 
recommendation and continues with an unsafe action, the Vessel Traffic Service may issue a 
“direction” to the vessel.  Failing to follow a “direction” may result in administrative hearings 
and civil, or even criminal, penalties.   
The effectiveness of Vessel Traffic Services to increase safety is generally accepted. The 
National Research Council (1996) concluded that Vessel Traffic Services “can be a significant 
factor in enhancing the safety and efficiency of ports and waterways when used in conjunction 
with other traditional aids to navigation and hydrographic and other information.”  The Volpe 
Port Needs Assessment (1991), as previously discussed in the Marine Environmental Protection 
section, estimated the economic value of increasing vessel safety through use of Vessel Traffic 
Services.  The study found that approximately 64% of cargo vessel casualties occurring between 
1979 and 1989 were caused by factors that a Vessel Traffic Service could have prevented or 
mitigated (Volpe 1991).  Of the 23 port regions evaluated, the study found that 11 would 
experience a positive net economic benefit of having Vessel Traffic Services.  More important 
than the report’s summary findings, however, is the analysis that allows vessel casualty risk 
profiles and economic costs of collisions, allisions, and groundings to be developed. 
Not surprisingly, the risk associated with a vessel transit is associated with the maritime setting 
in which the vessel is operating.  Table 4-14 contains the average casualty rates by navigational 
setting indicate the relative risk associated with different maritime navigation settings. 
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Table 4-17: National Average Casualty Rates by 
Navigational Setting (Number of casualties per 100K 
transits by med/large dry cargo and tank vessels) 
Navigational Setting Casualty Rate 
Open approach 2.3268 
Convergence 3.2506 
Open Harbor 8.4205 
Enclosed Harbor 4.5991 
Constricted Waterway 23.3147 
River 25.5178 
Total 9.6214 
Data obtained from Volpe (Vol III 1991: Table 4) 
 
The Volpe Port Needs Assessment found that for casualties involving participating vessels, 40% 
resulted in vessel damage, 3% resulted in fatalities, 10% resulted in injuries, 11% resulted in 
cargo damage or loss, 2% result in damage to an aid to navigation, 1% result in bridge damage, 
100% result in a Coast Guard response of some type, and 13% of casualties involving vessels 
carrying bulk cargoes resulted in hazardous spills (Volpe 1991).  These relative risk rates, or 
relative risk rates estimated from more recent data, can then be used to estimate the economic 
cost of vessels collisions, allisions, and groundings. 
Economic costs associated with vessel damage, loss or damage of cargo, aid to navigation 
damage, and Coast Guard response costs can be obtained or estimated from existing Coast 
Guard databases and will not be discussed further here.  Economic costs estimates associated 
with fatalities, injuries, and the spill of hazardous materials can be obtained from the previous 
sections of this thesis.  The remainder of this section will summarize economic costs associated 
with waterway blockages and bridge damage. 
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Vessel casualties that occur in narrow channel or waterways can potentially prevent other 
vessels from transiting the waterway.  Table 4-18 provides estimates developed by Volpe 
(1991) through interactions with knowledgeable persons. 
 
Table 4-18: Average Daily Costs of Channel Blockage by 
Vessel Type (for each day over 2 days a port is closed) 
Vessel Type Cost per Day (1990$) 
Passenger, small $75,000 
Passenger, medium $150,000 
Passenger, large $250,000 
Dry Cargo, small $9,000 
Dry Cargo, medium $12,000 
Dry Cargo, large $16,000 
Tanker, small $16,000 
Tanker, medium $20,000 
Tanker, large $24,000 
Tug & Barge, small $3,000 
Tug & Barge, large $5,000 
Fishing Vessel $9,000 
Other $4,000 
Data obtained from Volpe (Vol III 1991: Table 6-16) 
 
Table 4-19 summarizes the estimated cost of bridge damage resulting from vessel allisions.  The 
estimates do not include economic impacts resulting from bridge closures (e.g. additional 
transit time for alternate routes). 
Table 4-19: Cost of Bridge Damage by 
Severity of Casualty (1990$) 
Severity Cost 
Low $35,000 
Moderate $255,000 
Severe $10,784,000 
Data obtained from Volpe (Vol III 1991: Table 6-17) 
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4. Ice Operations 
 
Performance Goal: Maintain operational channels for navigation, limiting channel 
closures. 
Fundamental Outcome Unit: Channel closure days 
 
The Coast Guard’s ice operations mission consists of several distinct parts.  First, the Coast 
Guard conducts icebreaking activities during the winter to assist the movement of dry and 
liquid-bulk cargos through the Great Lakes and domestic ports and waterways.  This mission is 
the result of Executive Order No 7521 dated December 21, 1936 entitled “Use of Vessels for 
Icebreaking Operations in Channels and Harbors”.  This executive order stated: 
“The Coast Guard, operating under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury, is 
hereby directed to assist in keeping open to navigation by means of icebreaking 
operations, in so far as practicable and as the exigencies may require, channels and 
harbors in accordance with the reasonable demands of commerce; and to use for that 
purpose such vessels subject to its control and jurisdiction or which may be made 
available to it… as are necessary and are reasonable suitable for operations.” 
The Coast Guard accomplishes this by establishing “tracks” or pathways of broken ice through 
which vessels can transit.  If a vessel becomes or is about to become beset in ice, the Coast 
Guard directly assists the vessel to keep commerce flowing and to mitigate potential hazards 
(e.g. prevent a vessel beset in ice from being blown out of the channel resulting in a grounding).  
The economic benefits of domestic ice breaking are estimated to total more than $78 million 
(Volpe 1995) in the Great Lakes alone on account of reduced inventory levels of dry bulk and 
liquid cargoes during the winter season.  Looking more specifically at the impacts of waterways 
closures one week prior and two weeks following the winter closure of the St Mary’s River, the 
average economic benefit of maintaining navigation on the St Mary’s River during those three 
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weeks is approximately $12.24-21.47 million (1994$) (Volpe 1995).  Using an average value of 
$33.71 million for the 21 days, or $1.6 million per day (1994$). 
Estimates of economic benefits for domestic icebreaking services outside the Great Lakes were 
not located, however, shipping delays resulting from ice can be estimated using the economic 
costs of waterways closures provided in the previous aids to navigation section. 
The second ice breaking activity that the Coast Guard conducts is flood relief operations.  
During winter months, ice dams can form resulting in increased river levels and flooding of 
nearby areas.  In some situations, the Coast Guard is able to relief the flooding by breaking up 
the ice dams allowing the rivers to flow more freely.  I was unable to locate studies that 
estimated the economic benefits of flood relief operations due to ice dams. 
The third ice operations activity conducted by the Coast Guard is support of polar research and 
resupply of research outposts.  The National Research Council recommended to Congress that: 
“The nation needs the capability to operate in both polar regions reliably and at will. 
Specifically, the Committee recommends:  
• The United States should continue to project an active and influential presence in the 
Arctic to support its interests. This requires U.S. government polar icebreaking capability 
to assure year-round access throughout the region. 
• The United States should continue to project an active and influential presence in the 
Antarctic to support its interests. The nation should reliably control sufficient 
icebreaking capability to break a channel into and assure the maritime resupply of 
McMurdo Station...” (National Academy Sciences 2007) 
While estimates for transporting cargo to McMurdo is estimated to cost 11 cents per pound by 
ship as compared to $2.50 per pound by air (T-AK 4729, GlobalSecurity.org), estimated 
economic benefits of icebreaking services performed by the Coast Guard as compared to other 
potential ice breaking service providers, were not able to be located. 
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The fourth ice operations activity performed by the Coast Guard is the International Ice Patrol.  
This activity consists of determining the limits of all known ice originating from the North 
Atlantic and providing that information to mariners to aid in their voyage planning.  This 
activity, resulting from the sinking of the Titanic in 1912, has remained essentially unchanged 
since its inception in 1914.  The success of this activity is demonstrated by the fact that there 
have been no ship-iceberg collisions reported outside the limits of all known ice since the 
program’s inception.  Conversely, in 1993 three ship-iceberg collisions occurred inside the limits 
of all known ice resulting in significant vessel damage (Pritchett 1997).  By estimating reduced 
transit costs associated with knowing the limits of all known ice, Pritchett estimated that the 
International Ice Patrol results in approximately $3.5 million of economic value each year 
(Pritchett 1997). 
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D. Summary of Mission Outcome Values and the Coast Guard 
Consequence Equivalency Matrix  
 
Recognizing the need to tradeoff expected mission related outcomes to make budgetary 
decisions, the Coast Guard recently developed a methodology to compare the expected level of 
public benefit across multiple mission areas.  Glander (2007) observes that the Coast Guard has 
historically relied on the purchase of multi-mission assets, thereby creating a flexible and 
adaptable force, to meet complex challenges spanning multiple missions.  Given these 
challenges, the Coast Guard has begun to evaluate reductions in overall public risk as a basis for 
budgetary decisions.  To accomplish this, the public risk “owner” must be able to consistently 
measure public risk across multiple Coast Guard mission outcomes using the same scale 
(Glander 2007). 
The first step in developing a consistent public risk scale is to delineate the risk related 
outcomes that the agency is responsible for or can reasonably influence.  Bounding constraints 
such as outcome time horizon and complementary agency roles and contributions must be 
defined (Glander 2007).  This is followed by the need to develop a consequence scoring system 
that can equate varying levels of public risk across multiple mission outcome types and 
developing the basis to rank the resulting public risks.  Glander highlights the challenges of 
comparing public risk for discrete events (e.g. collisions) versus non-discrete measures or 
difficult to measure flows (e.g. compliance levels and drug smuggling flows).  Finally, the overall 
public risk is assessed for the stated time horizon based on the expected frequency and 
distribution of mission outcome types.   
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The above process resulted in development of the Coast Guard Risk Assessment and 
Consequence Equivalency Matrix.  The consequence equivalency matrix consists of rows 
representing outcome types roughly associated with the Coast Guard’s eleven mission areas.  In 
addition, qualitative assessments of addition concerns (e.g. primary and secondary economic 
costs at the regional/national level and the public’s perceptions concerning national security, 
civil order, and symbolic impact) are considered.  Each outcome type is broken down into eight 
levels of severity representing a 10 million factor range in relative risk.  For example, the lowest 
risk range for human life represents one injury while the most severe represents more than 
100,000 fatalities.  The individual cells representing relative risk values for each outcome type 
are estimated using a combination of scholarly or governmental references with values for 
resulting gaps being developed using expert opinion collected over several years.  A full version 
of the Coast Guard’s Consequence Equivalency Matrix is not included since it has not been 
publically released to date. 
The tenets of the Coast Guard Consequence Equivalency Matrix align closely with the 
documentation of research conducted by this thesis.  Several important differences do exist but 
not to the detriment of either approach.  While the Coast Guard Consequence Equivalency 
Matrix combines academic and government research with expert opinion to estimate the 
relative public risk associated with a wide range of scenarios, Chapter 4 of this thesis focused on 
the economic value of fundamental mission outcome units to compare risks across mission 
areas.  Comparing the relative risk values of the Consequence Equivalency Matrix and the 
economic costs identified in Chapter 4 reveals some substantial differences in relative public 
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risk “value” as shown in Table 4-20 below.  Representative risk and economic values were 
calculated relative to the value of a single statistical life. 
Table 4-20: Comparison of Consequence Equivalency Matrix 
Relative Risk Values versus Relative Economic Values 
Outcome 
Relative 
Risk Value 
Relative 
Economic Value 
1 life saved 1.00 1.00 
8K gallon oil spill prevented 1.26 0.30 
10 kg cocaine interdicted 0.64 0.86 
500 undocumented migrants interdicted 1.00 5.33 
 
The above differences highlight the complementary nature of these two approaches and an 
opportunity to create a more comprehensive consequence equivalency matrix based on a 
different research basis.  The above differences between relative risk value and relative 
economic value are not sufficient justification to shift resources from one mission area to 
another.  As discussed in Chapter 8, a more thorough understanding of the relative impacts that 
changes in resource levels dedicated to specific mission areas will have are needed. 
Table 4-21 summarizes the performance outcome values developed in Chapter 4.  All Table 4-
21 values have been adjusted for inflation to 2007 dollars using U.S. Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics conversion factors found at http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/cpicalc.pl .   
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Table 4-21: Economic Value of Coast Guard Mission Outcomes 
Mission 
Role Mission Performance Goal 
Performance Target 
(FY07) 
Fundamental 
Outcome 
Unit 
Economic 
Value (2007$) 
Sa
fe
ty
 Search and Rescue Save mariners in imminent danger on our nation’s 
oceans and waterways. 
86% of mariners saved Life $7,615,000/life 
Marine Safety Eliminate maritime fatalities and injuries on our 
nation’s oceans and waterways. 
4,721 or fewer fatalities 
or injuries 
Life & injury $1,639,000/injury 
MAIS4/Severe 
Se
cu
ri
ty
 
Ports, Waterways, 
and Coastal Security 
Reduce homeland security risk in the maritime 
domain. 
15% reduction in risk Risk of terrorist 
attack 
To Be Determined 
Illegal Drug 
Interdiction 
Increase the removal rate of cocaine.  The 
percentage of the non-commercial maritime flow 
of cocaine to the U.S. seized, jettisoned, 
abandoned, or otherwise destroyed. 
26% removal rate Kilogram of 
cocaine 
$259,000/kg 
Undocumented 
Migrant Interdiction 
Increase the interdiction rate of illegal migrants (all 
nationalities) attempting to enter the U.S. via 
maritime means. 
67% interdiction rate Un-
documented 
migrant 
$32,000/migrant 
Defense Readiness Support our national security and military 
strategies by ensuring assets are at the level of 
readiness required by the Combatant Commander. 
100% readiness Unit readiness 
level 
To Be Determined 
Other Law 
Enforcement 
Reduce the number of vessel incursions into the 
U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). 
199 or fewer incursions Vessel incursion To Be Determined 
St
ew
ar
d
sh
ip
 
Marine Environmental 
Protection 
Eliminate oil spills and chemical discharge 
incidents > 100 gallons. 
19 or fewer oil spills & 
chemical discharges 
Oil spill, 
chemical 
discharge 
$106,700,000/spill 
(500K oil spill) 
Living Marine 
Resources 
Increase the observed compliance rate of domestic 
fishing vessels. 
97% observed compliance 
rate 
Compliance 
rate 
To Be Determined 
Aids to Navigation Eliminate collisions, allisions, and groundings by 
vessels on our nation’s oceans and waterways. 
1,664 or fewer collisions, 
allisions, & groundings 
Collisions, 
allisions, 
groundings 
Dependent on 
Current Vessel Risk 
Profile 
Ice Operations Maintain operational channels for navigation, 
limiting channel closures. 
Less than 2 days during 
average winters, 8 days 
during severe winters 
Channel closure 
days 
$2,246,000/closure 
day (Great Lakes 
only) 
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Chapter 5: Strategic Guidance 
 
“Strategy without tactics is the slowest route to victory. Tactics without strategy is the noise before 
defeat.” 
Sun Tzu, b. 500 B.C. 
Merriam-Webster defines strategy as “the science and art of employing the political, economic, 
psychological, and military forces of a nation or group of nations to afford the maximum 
support to adopted policies in peace or war.” 2  In the military, strategy is the broadest of the 
three levels of planning that link national strategic objectives to tactical actions.  Military 
planners generally categorize activities into strategic, operational, and tactical levels in order to 
better organize and logically arrange complex operations, distribute resources, and assign 
activities to the appropriate entity or unit (Joint Pub 3-0 2008). 
In a military context, strategy is defined as “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the 
instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, 
national, and/or multinational objectives” (Joint Pub 3-0 2008).  Although it is the broadest of 
the planning levels, strategic planning is still anchored to national-level strategies, policies, and 
laws.  Strategy is also shaped by service doctrine which includes the underlying beliefs and 
principles that characterize the organization.  Another perspective of doctrine is that it 
“represents what is taught, believed, and advocated as what is right” (Joint Pub 1 2007).  Given 
that national-level guidance and the Coast Guard service doctrine shapes strategy, objectives 
are determined, guidance is developed, and potential resources are identified within a 
                                                          
2
 Merriam-Webster Online Dictionary. Access March 11, 2008 from http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/strategy  
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framework.  In short, strategy provides the conceptual framework upon which more detailed 
courses of action, or series of actions, are developed and refined. 
The operational level is the second level of planning.  The operational level links the conceptual 
framework established by strategy to the tactical use of forces.  Activities at the operational 
level focus on how to best organize and apportion available forces, and sequence their actions, 
to achieve stated objectives.  Coast Guard operational level planning efforts will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6. 
The tactical level is the third and most detail oriented level of planning.  At the tactical level of 
planning, allocated resources are employed in a coordinated fashion for shorter duration 
efforts to achieve stated objectives.  The tactical level of planning is mentioned here primarily 
for completeness purposes only. 
Before reviewing and discussing the current strategic guidance in place in the Coast Guard, I will 
provide a brief overview of how long-term strategy is currently developed in the Coast Guard.  
The brief history of the Coast Guard provided in Chapter 3 highlights how the Coast Guard’s 
missions and organization have continually evolved to meet the changing needs of the 
American public.   
In the mid-1990’s the Coast Guard was faced with the sobering reality that a vast majority of its 
assets would simultaneously reach the end of their planned service lives within 10 years.  This 
situation, coupled with the macro trends of trade globalization, shifts in global power balances, 
and seamless information technologies, highlighted the fact that the Coast Guard needed to 
consider the long-term trends and challenges facing the nation.  In addition, the Coast Guard 
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needed to incorporate the resulting impacts and consequences of these macro-trends into its 
long-term planning.  To accomplish this, the Coast Guard established the Long View strategic 
planning exercise to develop a process that would enable the service to better understand the 
challenges and manage associated risks.  The Long View initiative had important cultural 
implications.  The Coast Guard has long been rewarded for its reaction and response expertise.  
Long View sought to augment these characteristics with a more formalized ability to anticipate 
and plan.  By being able to anticipate large-scale changes in national needs, the Coast Guard 
would be better positioned to react and respond (Evergreen 2005). 
The primary output of the Long View exercise was the adoption of scenario-based planning to 
develop long-term strategies.  Although several important over-arching concepts were 
identified and strategies were developed around five of the sixteen future-world scenario’s 
discussed, few of the strategies were incorporated into Coast Guard budgeting and operational 
planning activities.  This was due to a general lack of integration between the different planning 
activities (Evergreen 2005).  Faced with the challenges of integrating into the newly formed 
Department of Homeland Security in 2002, the Coast Guard conducted an assessment of the 
Long View exercise to determine the relative strengths, weaknesses, and applicability of 
scenario-based strategic planning.  Long View’s strengths included the continued viability of the 
five scenarios that were identified and the applicability of the scenario-based process.  Long 
View weaknesses included short-sighted assumptions regarding the duration and indirect 
impacts of international threats as well as assumptions that indirectly limited the Coast Guard’s 
future role.  Based on this assessment of Long View strengths and weaknesses, the Coast Guard 
initiated Project Evergreen with the goal of providing the Coast Guard with “the essential tools, 
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knowledge, and insights to act effectively despite much greater uncertainty about the future” 
(Evergreen 2005).  This process consisted of the following: 
 Identification and definition of the large-scale “dimensions” of change.  The following 
four dimensions were identified: Rate of Globalization (increasing or decreasing), Public 
Perception of Threat to Security and Quality of Life (high or low), U.S. Concept of 
Sovereignty (traditional or non-traditional), and U.S. Economy Strength (strong or 
weak). 
 Definition of the sixteen world scenario’s that result from applying the four dimensions 
in their extreme states. 
 Five scenarios that represent the greatest risks and opportunities for the Coast Guard 
are selected for further development. 
 Identification and refinement of core strategies that best address the risks and 
opportunities identified in the five scenarios.  In total, eleven core strategies were 
identified. 
These eleven core strategies were further categorized into the following four strategic 
imperatives: 
 Shape the global maritime setting to promote U.S. national interests. 
 Know the maritime conditions, anomalies, and threats to prevent, protect, and respond. 
 Create and manage an integrated U.S. maritime domain to preserve and promote the 
national interest. 
 Position the Coast Guard to act with strategic intent in a complex and uncertain 
environment (Evergreen 2005). 
 
Achievement of the above strategic imperatives can only be accomplished by acting with 
strategic intent which consists of adopting a systems view, focusing on intent, thinking across 
time, creating and testing hypotheses, and being intelligently opportunistic (Evergreen 2005).  
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Once the Coast Guard had determined a framework for its future direction, it needed to 
develop the means to achieve it.   
To address the lack of integration experienced for Long View initiatives, the Evergreen Process 
has been incorporated into the Coast Guard Commandant’s command cycle.  It serves as an 
entering input and evaluation criteria for future budgeting and operational planning initiatives 
as well as for development of Coast Guard training and education programs.  Finally, it serves as 
a framework for ad hoc decisions that may arise outside the standard planning processes but 
require a long-term or strategic perspective (Evergreen 2005). 
The strategic imperatives that result from the Evergreen process are broad and lack the 
specificity of context.  Additional context and limits are provided by several sources of guidance 
including: presidential directives, federal statutes and acts, international agreements, and 
statements of national strategy.  The significant sources of guidance for development of Coast 
Guard strategy are listed in figure 5-1. 
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Figure 5-1: CG Strategy for Maritime Security, Safety, and Stewardship 
The Coast Guard has established a framework of strategic plans and guidance that spans its 
eleven missions while taking into account the range of guidance available from outside sources.  
This framework includes the formation of the Coast Guard’s maritime strategy based on inputs 
from external guidance sources, Coast Guard doctrine (contained in Coast Guard Publication 1), 
and Coast Guard Evergreen outcomes.  The Coast Guard Strategy then feeds the development 
of Operational Campaign Plans, Budget Strategy, and Readiness Plans which support the tenets 
of the overarching strategy in a coordinated fashion.  Figure 5-2 summarizes this framework of 
strategic plans and their associated time horizons. 
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Figure 5-2: CG Strategy Framework 
 
Coast Guard Publication 1 serves as the foundation for Coast Guard doctrine.  It summarizes the 
underlying beliefs and principles that characterize the Coast Guard and anchors development of 
operational and support doctrines (not shown) which enable consistent execution of 
Operational Campaign Plans and Readiness Plans, respectively.  The following seven principles 
of Coast Guard operations are identified in Coast Guard Publication 1: clear objective, effective 
presence, unity of effort, on-scene initiative, flexibility, managed risk, and restraint.  Detailed 
descriptions of each principle are contained in Appendix 2. 
Due to the Coast Guard’s military heritage and membership in the U.S. Armed Forces, the 
service also incorporates joint military doctrine as part of its strategic guidance.  An overview of 
military principles of war is included in Appendix 3. 
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Given external strategic guidance, the Coast Guard’s organizational principles/doctrine, and the 
long-term outlook established by the Evergreen process, an overarching strategy can be 
developed.  The Coast Guard’s Strategy for Maritime Safety, Security, and Stewardship contains 
several important aspects that drive downstream operational, budgetary, and support plans. 
Building on the organizations character and strengths identified in Coast Guard Publication 1, 
the Coast Guard Strategy identifies key strengths that are considered essential to meeting 
future mission challenges (CG Strategy 2007).  These key strengths include: 
 Broad authorities and an expansive network of partnerships: Combined, these strengths 
form the foundation for building layered and multi-faceted safety and security systems. 
 Flexible, adaptable operational capability and presence: The Coast Guard’s 
demonstrated ability to quickly scale prevention and response capabilities to counter 
recurring and developing maritime threats enables the service to build upon multi-
agency partnerships. 
 Access and relevant expertise within the international community: The Coast Guard’s 
shared common purpose with many of the world’s maritime forces combined with its 
extensive history of international cooperation enable it to develop global solutions to 
world-wide problems. 
 
These key strengths are needed to counter national and global maritime threats.  According to 
the Coast Guard Strategy, the five most prominent challenges and threats that require 
increased focus are: 
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 The increasing complexity and use of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone. 
 The growth of the global maritime supply system. 
 The emergence of transnational threats that exploit the complexity of the maritime 
domain and the vulnerabilities of the global supply system. 
 The increasing scale of and potential for catastrophic incidents, whether caused by 
nature or weapons of mass destruction. 
 The vastness, anonymity, and limited governance of the global maritime domain. 
Before action can be taken to address the challenges and threats, Coast Guard leaders must 
understand the context within which their actions must fit.  According to the Coast Guard 
Strategy, this context, also known as maritime governance, consists of the following three 
parts: 
 Maritime Regimes: The system of rules that determine acceptable activity. 
 Maritime Domain Awareness: The ability to detect and monitor the maritime environs 
through situational awareness and intelligence. 
 Operational Capabilities: The systems used to deter, verify, respond to, and counter 
threats in the maritime domain. 
 
The application of the Coast Guard’s key strengths to counter challenges and threats within the 
system of maritime governance resulted in the identification of strategic priorities for 
incorporation into present and future Coast Guard mission activities.  The following six 
strategies were identified in the published Coast Guard Strategy (2007): 
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 Strengthen regimes for the U.S. maritime domain that increase transparency of activity, 
reduce risk, and balance competing uses within the maritime domain.  
 Achieve Awareness in the Maritime Domain: Enhanced abilities to collect, fuse, analyze, 
and share information about the maritime domain are required.  
 Enhance unity of effort in maritime planning and operations: The Coast Guard must 
improve the integration of its efforts with those of other government entities and 
private sector partners through enhanced unity of effort, and where possible, unity of 
command.  
 Integrate Coast Guard capabilities for national defense: Build upon and extend the 
“National Fleet” model to support U.S. national security interests in close partnership 
with the U.S. Navy along U.S. coasts, the high seas, and deployed abroad. 
 Develop a national capacity for Marine Transportation System recovery: Ensure the 
continuity of commerce and critical maritime activities through coordinated planning 
and response to maritime system disruptions.  
 Focus international engagement on improving maritime governance: Assist partner 
nations and maritime organizations with the development and implementation of 
enhanced regimes, awareness, and operational capabilities. 
As shown in Figure 5-2, the Coast Guard Strategy guides the content of operational campaign 
plans, budget strategy, and readiness plans.  These strategies and plans, when executed, 
further communicate and reinforce the intent of the Coast Guard Strategy.  Specifically, 
strategic intent is communicated by several forms.  First, strategic intent is communicated by 
explicitly stating and communicating the strategy ideas; this was accomplished by the 
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publication and distribution of the Coast Guard Strategy.  Second, the strategy must be 
interpreted and implemented into more detailed operational plans; this facet of 
communicating strategic intent is discussed in detail in Chapter 6.  Third, strategic intent is 
communicated by budgeting and the acquisition of capabilities needed to implement the 
strategy.  To illustrate how the Coast Guard Strategy is carried out through the budget strategy, 
the following excerpt links the Coast Guard’s budget for fiscal year 2008 to the three tenets of 
maritime governance outlined above: 
“President Bush requested $8.7B for the Coast Guard to:  
• Improve Operational Capability: Improving Coast Guard capabilities is vital to 
controlling our maritime borders and preserving our multi-mission responsiveness. The 
budget addresses this need through development of the “Strategic Trident” Force 
Structure, controlling and extending our maritime borders, and creating adaptive force 
packaging.  
• Build Awareness: Greater awareness of people, vessels, and cargo in the maritime 
domain will help identify threats before they reach our vital ports, waterways and 
coastline, and aid in risk-based decision-making. The budget addresses this need through 
Global Maritime Intelligence Integration and Leveraging Partnerships. 
• Create Maritime Regimes: Port security, and the broader concept of maritime security, 
cannot be reduced to a single threat vector, a single theory. Maritime security impacts, 
and is impacted by, economic structures, intermodal transportation systems, and the 
environment.”3 
 
And finally, strategic intent is communicated by promulgating supporting policies and 
programs, as well as the deletion of conflicting plans and policies.  Building organizational unity 
of effort for the support and execution of strategy enables readiness plans to focus scarce 
resources on improving and sustaining the most needed capabilities.  Since this thesis focuses 
on the development of operational strategy, further development of the Coast Guard’s budget 
strategy and readiness plans will not be discussed in detail. 
  
                                                          
3
 Source: CG Snapshot 2007. Accessed August 14, 2007 from http://homeport.uscg.mil/  
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Chapter 6: Operational Planning System 
 
“Failing to plan is planning to fail.” 
Unknown 
 
 
Communicating strategic intent in a multi-mission organization like the Coast Guard is 
complicated by the interactions and trade-offs that occur when apportioning scarce resources 
between the competing mission sets.  For example, staging a Coast Guard cutter in the Mona 
Pass off Haiti deters individuals from attempting to illegally migrate to the United States by 
boat.  It also deters the transport and transshipment of illegal substances, such as marijuana, 
through the Mona Pass resulting in a secondary or even tertiary benefit to the U.S. drug 
enforcement policy.  On the negative side, the cutter’s presence in the Mona Pass means that it 
is not conducting fishery enforcement operations off Georges Banks, not conducting counter-
drug operations off the coast of Ecuador, or not screening high interest vessels entering the 
Port of Houston.  The traditional factors of time, geographic distance, number of available 
resources, and resource effectiveness play critical roles in determining how to best use these 
resources in a context sensitive setting.  To provide this context, the Coast Guard develops 
multi-year strategies for each of its eleven missions which are then used to develop a cross-
mission strategy and operational plan. 
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A. Operational Campaign Plans 
In the past, Coast Guard mission program managers, or the teams of individuals responsible for 
developing policies and obtaining resources needed to implement those policies through the 
federal budget process, promulgated and communicated mission specific guidance via a variety 
of policy publications and operating procedures.  The result of this approach was a moderately 
effective “system” of guidance documents that slowly adapted to changes in strategic direction.  
The advent of the unified Coast Guard Strategy in 2007 required a more agile and adaptive 
process to align the efforts of the eleven different missions.  As a result, mission program 
managers were directed to develop mission specific campaign plans compliant with the 
following criteria: 
 Encompass at least a 5-6 year timeframe. 
 Explicitly define mission statements, guiding principles, and long-term objectives specific 
to each mission. 
 Identify interagency relationships and applicable strategic management frameworks. 
 Identify mission measures and baseline levels of performance to allow comparisons 
between mission related risks and results, external performance drivers and trends, and 
explicit performance targets. 
 Summarize planned performance improvement initiatives including their purpose, 
scope, major milestones, quantifiable benefits, and costs. 
At the time this guidance was given, campaign plans that met some of the above criteria existed 
for eight of the Coast Guard’s eleven missions.  As a result, three new campaign plans are now 
being developed and the seven existing campaign plans are being reviewed and updated.  
Example guidance from one of the better existing campaign plans is included in Appendix D.  
The quantification of economic values associated with specific mission outcomes detailed in 
Chapter 4 could be used to prioritize long-term objectives, compare mission related risks and 
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results, identify appropriate performance targets, and quantify benefits associated with mission 
specific initiatives. 
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B. The Coast Guard Standard Operational Planning Process 
 
In 2005, the Coast Guard began the process of developing an operational planning process that 
could be standardized across all missions and in all areas of operation.  Prior to 2001, the 
operational planning processes reflected the service’s professional “communities” and were 
grouped by mission type. Operations related to the marine safety and environmental response 
missions were generally centrally managed, planned, and resourced with execution occurring at 
the regional and local levels.  Search and rescue programs were centrally planned and 
resourced, however operational management and execution activities were very dispersed.  
Due to the Coast Guard’s historical culture and organizational biases, assets identified as search 
and rescue resources were generally set aside to ensure their availability to respond to any 
future search and rescue missions.  Operations related to law enforcement missions were 
generally more decentralized but required extensive coordination across various operational 
commanders.  As a result of this need for coordination, the law enforcement missions 
established a centralized operational planning process to ensure a balanced application of 
resources across all law enforcement missions that reflected national priorities.  This planning 
process focused on the illegal drug interdiction, undocumented migrant interdiction, living 
marine resources, and other law enforcement missions; some defense operations were 
included in the process since these missions often competed for the same assets.   
Following the terrorist attacks of September 11th 2001, the asset demands for the ports, 
waterways, and coastal security mission grew substantially thereby driving its inclusion into the 
law enforcement planning process.  Inclusion of the ports, waterways, and coastal security 
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mission challenged the traditional operational planning process because this mission was being 
conducted with assets that traditionally performed law enforcement activities under the 
authority of the captains of the port, who traditionally focused on marine safety and 
environmental response activities.  In addition, the tremendous resource demands for ports, 
waterways, and coastal security activities led to a reassessment of the amount of resources 
held in reserve for traditional search and rescue operations.  It soon became clear that a more 
comprehensive and inclusive operational planning process was required. 
In 2005, the Coast Guard was in the process of re-organizing to better align its missions and 
organizational structure to meet the needs posed by a post September 11th world and the Coast 
Guard’s move to the Department of Homeland Security.  These efforts provided the 
opportunity to revamp and overhaul its operational planning process.  In December 2005, the 
Coast Guard announced a program to develop a new multi-mission operational planning 
system.  The communiqué that announced this effort summarized the current planning 
situation within the Coast Guard as follows: 
“COAST GUARD PROGRAMMATIC ORGANIZATION HAS OFTEN PRODUCED 
OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE IN STOVEPIPES THAT SOMETIMES SKIPPED 
LEVELS OF THE ORGANIZATION. THE INTEGRATION OF THIS 
PROGRAMMATIC GUIDANCE PRIMARILY OCCURS AT THE TACTICAL 
LEVEL (FORMER GROUPS AND MSOS). THE VERTICAL ALIGNMENT 
EFFORT AT THE SECTORS, DISTRICTS, AREAS AND AT HQ PROVIDE 
AN OPPORTUNITY TO DEVELOP AN ENTERPRISE SOLUTION WHILE 
PRESERVING THE AUTONOMY OF UNITS TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS AS 
EVENTS REQUIRE… ON-SCENE INITIATIVE AND DECISION-MAKING 
REMAINS AND WILL REMAIN THE KEY FACTOR IN SUCCESSFUL COAST 
GUARD OPERATIONS.” (CG ALCOAST 613/05) 
 
In addition to improving alignment, the communication of strategic intent and allocation of 
scarce resources would improve under a standard operational planning process as cited below: 
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“A STANDARD OPERATIONAL PLANNING PROCESS WILL EFFECTIVELY 
TRANSLATE STRATEGIC INTENT TO THE FIELD THROUGH MISSION 
PRIORITIZATION, MISSION BALANCE, AND OPTIMAL RESOURCE 
ALLOCATION. ADDITIONALLY, IT WILL ASSIST IN SYNCHRONIZING 
AND SEQUENCING MULTIPLE RELATED INITIATIVES, INCLUDING 
MAJOR PROJECTS LIKE DEEPWATER.” (CG ALCOAST 613/05) 
 
Finally, a standardized operational planning process was viewed as a future cornerstone 
process for Coast Guard operations. 
“THE DESIRED OUTCOME OF THIS EFFORT IS TO ESTABLISH A 
SYSTEMATIC PROCESS BY WHICH WE DEVELOP STANDARD POLICY, 
DOCTRINE AND PROCESSES FOR USE BY HEADQUARTERS, AREAS, 
DISTRICTS AND SECTORS AND ENSURE ALIGNMENT WITH DHS 
INTITIATIVES. THIS PROCESS WILL ALIGN, SYNCHRONIZE AND 
SEQUENCE INFORMATION FLOW AND PROVIDE ORGANIZATIONAL 
STANDARDS WHICH WILL REDUCE DUPLICATION OF EFFORT, CREATE 
TRAINING REQUIREMENTS, INCREASE EFFICIENCIES AND 
OPERATIONAL EFFECTIVENESS, AND ENABLE INTEROPERABILITY WITH 
PARTNERS.” (CG ALCOAST 613/05) 
 
Upon publication of this vision, the Coast Guard set out on a 22 month journey of developing, 
evaluating, and prototyping a comprehensive operational planning process.  In October 2007, 
the Coast Guard promulgated and put into effect the Coast Guard Standard Operational 
Planning Process (SOPP) with the deliberate goal of improving communication of strategic 
intent and translating that intent into mission performance outcomes.  Specifically, 
”The principal aim of the SOPP is to ensure effective translation of strategic intent to 
mission outcomes. This is accomplished by providing mission guidance and direction, 
priorities, performance targets, and resource apportionment and allocation with 
constructive feedback distributed throughout the chain of command.” (CG Instruction 
3120.4) 
 
The principle framework used to accomplish the translation of strategic intent, as well as the 
fostering of constructive feedback, is employment of an iterative feedback loop.  Figure 6-1 
highlights the fundamental feedback loop upon which the standardized operational planning 
process is built. 
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Figure 6-1: Coast Guard Planning and Decision Making Framework (CG SOPP Guide) 
 
 
At first, above framework appears serial in nature.  First, direction is given and resources are 
allocated to prioritized missions.  Second, missions are executed and the resulting performance 
is measured.  And finally, various levels of the organization adapt to gaps in performance and 
proposed possible remedies.  In reality, the framework operates in parallel.  Direction is initially 
proposed as the desired “end-state” and subordinate commands are provided the opportunity 
to summarize the resources and policies they will need in order to accomplish the stated 
objectives based on past operational experiences and forecast changes in the resources and the 
external environment.  This feedback loop provides senior managers the opportunity to identify 
the requisite resources, adapt policies, or adjust their goals accordingly.  This process occurs 
between all levels of the organization as shown in figure 6-2 below. 
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Figure 6-2: Coast Guard Planning and Decision Making across  
Organizational Levels (CG SOPP Guide) 
 
This iterative feedback process results in an extended and sometimes complicated flow of 
proposals, counter proposals, resource requests, directives, status reports, performance 
assessments, and proposed corrective actions.  As a result, operational planning efforts begin 
one year in advance of the planned performance period.  Given that performance assessments 
are conducted after completion of a performance period, a planning staff will simultaneously 
be conducting planning efforts spanning three years; performance assessments for the previous 
period, execution of the current period, and planning for the upcoming period.  This dynamic is 
captured in the graphical summary of information flow shown in figure 6-3 below. 
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Figure 6-3: Operational Planning Calendar (CG SOPP Guide) 
 
As shown in Figure 6-3, there are four distinct phases of the operational planning process.  The 
initial planning stage seeks to document and understand past and current performance factors 
and identify internal and external trends that may affect future performance.  The second stage 
is the strategic planning direction development stage.  During this stage, mission guidance 
including overall mission priorities, performance targets, and resource use ceilings are 
communicated for all missions having taken into account feedback provided from the 
operational commanders.  The third stage of the operational planning process is the plan 
promulgation stage which focuses on the further development of operational plans to include 
the apportionment (i.e to distribute or divide available resources between missions) and 
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allocation (i.e. assign available resources to specific missions) of all available resources.  The 
fourth and final stage is the operational execution and reporting stage in which operations are 
conducted and performance is evaluated and communicated back up the chain of command.  
Use of cross-mission outcome values during the second and third stages of the planning process 
identified above could result in delivery of improved, or even optimized, overall public service 
value. 
I will limit my summary of the Coast Guard Standard Operational Planning Process to the high 
level overview provided above.  Due to the sensitive nature of actual mission planning 
guidance, I am unable to include an analysis of mission guidance below the strategic level.  
However, Chapter 7 will discuss observed limitations and potential challenges facing the Coast 
Guard’s Standard Operational Planning Process identified during the course of interviews with 
operational planning practitioners and subject matter experts.  
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Chapter 7: Challenges to the Standard Operations Planning Process 
“This report, by its very length, defends itself against the risk of being read.” 
Winston Churchill, 1874-1965 
 
I interviewed ten Coast Guard personnel to learn about the new Standard Operational Planning 
Process and to better understand how it was actually being applied and used.  As indicated in 
Chapter Two, these ten people represented a variety of roles and responsibilities in all three 
levels of the operational chain of command.  All interviews were conducted in person at their 
respective places of work.  Appendix E contains a listing of questions used to frame the 
discussion for each interview.  Due to the range of personal roles and responsibilities of the 
individuals being interviewed, I did not ask all interviewees all questions.  Instead, I selected 
specific questions to serve as a starting point to build a conversation that targeted the issues or 
perspectives directly relevant to the individual being interviewed. 
The result of these ten interviews was a better understanding of the process improvements 
achieved through the implementation of the Standard Operational Planning Process as well as 
the challenges that may lie ahead.  Many of these comparisons are made based on my 
professional experiences as a program analyst at Coast Guard Headquarters during the period 
1994-1998 and as the senior operations planning analyst at Coast Guard Atlantic Area during 
the period 2001-2004.  During these assignments, I became very familiar with the operational 
planning aspects of the Coast Guard’s strategic resource acquisition process and the 
implementation of the then current operational planning process prior to and following the 
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September 11th terrorist attacks that drove fundamental changes in how the Coast Guard plans 
operations. 
Before jumping directly into the discussion of improvements and potential future challenges 
that await the Coast Guard’s Standard Operational Planning Process, it is important to note that 
the experiences of the interviewees and my own observations are based on a process that has 
yet to complete its first full planning cycle.  The standard operational planning process was only 
formally implemented in September-October of 2007 after a one-year prototype of limited 
scope.  Improvements will be made as practitioners progress along the learning curve and the 
organization continuously adapts and adjusts.  Similarly, new problems will arise as the process 
is applied in unanticipated situations.  These truths are inevitable. 
The Standard Operational Planning Process is a significant improvement over previous 
operational planning processes.  It is a truly multi-mission planning process.  It was designed as 
such from the very beginning resulting in a more balanced representation of the competing 
needs of the Coast Guard’s eleven missions.  In addition to spanning all of the Coast Guard’s 
missions, it encompasses and accounts for a far greater percentage of the Coast Guard’s 
operational resources.  While not every operational resource is accounted for, as discussed 
below, a critical mass of resources are now managed through the standard operational 
planning process to make the process relevant to all mission areas and geographic regions. 
In addition to spanning more missions and resources, the new process better aligns and 
communicates strategic intent throughout the organization.  Alignment between the 
operational, budget, and resource support strategies is crucial to the long-term viability of the 
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process and is arguably the most important improvement of the new process.  One reason that 
this alignment is now possible is the fact that the Coast Guard’s organizational structure is 
better aligned to reduce programmatic and geographically based domains.  The Standard 
Operational Planning Process was not thrust upon the Coast Guard’s traditional mission based 
organization; it was developed in conjunction with a more functionally based organization that 
emphasizes cross-mission performance and adaptability.  And finally, unrelated to its actual 
content, the standard operational planning process was given significant visibility and senior 
level support resulting in increased emphasis on deliberate planning processes throughout the 
organization. 
Despite these significant successes and improvements, the standard operational planning 
process is not without future challenges.  Most notably, it is a victim of its own success.  By 
encompassing all missions and a greater share of operational resources, the complexity and 
sheer volume of information that must be communicated has almost doubled.  For example, 
despite the existence of the Coast Guard Maritime Strategy and seven mission campaign plans, 
the strategic guidance statement for fiscal year 2008 consists of over 45 pages of detailed 
external and internal threats, performance goals, and resource management ceilings.  The 
operational guidance statement totals 18 single-spaced pages and data tables.  At the tactical 
level, weekly or bi-weekly operations plans that summarize planned operations in a local 
geographic region routinely exceed four single spaced pages.  Managing the volume of 
information, communications, and the associated administrative burdens, without degrading 
the communication of strategic intent, will be crucial to the benefit-cost perceived by 
practitioners of the new process. 
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Compounding the problems associated with the volume of communications and associated 
administrative burdens, operational planning staffs are often required to perform ancillary 
tasks that prevent the timely completion of operational planning duties.  This situation is not 
unique to the operational planning staffs and is quite common throughout the organization.  
The unfortunate consequence for operational planning staffs, however, is that delays and 
compromised work quality that result from the performance of ancillary tasks, ripples 
throughout the constructed and dependent feedback cycles, growing over time.  The standard 
operational planning process was deliberately designed to provide timely feedback up and 
down the chain of command.  The delay of a single sector performance assessment will either 
delay the completion of summary assessments conducted at higher levels of the organization or 
result in summary assessments being completed with incomplete information.  Either result 
erodes the overall process. 
Another major challenge facing the new process is its ability to objectively prioritize mission 
goals and planning guidance.  This challenge appears to have carried over from the previous 
operational planning process.  For example, the following statement of operational guidance 
and direction was obtained from the initial planning guidance for fiscal year 2009 operations: 
“OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE AND DIRECTION: OPERATION NEPTUNE 
SHIELD, MARITIME SENTINEL, OCEAN GUARDIAN, OCEAN STEWARD, 
SOVEREIGN SHORES, AND STEEL WEB, AS WELL AS MARINE SAFETY 
AND SECURITY COMPLIANCE WILL CONTINUE TO BE A HIGH 
PRIORITY.” (CG Msg 121608Z Oct 2007) 
 
The above listed campaign plans account for eight of the Coast Guard’s eleven primary 
missions.  The mission areas that are not covered in the above listing include search and rescue, 
defense operations, and other law enforcement; search and rescue is arguably of equal or 
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higher priority than those listed above and defense operations are tied to external events and 
national priorities.  Without an objective basis that allows operational commanders to compare 
trade-offs associated with different missions, blanket priority statements as listed above add 
little value.  Incorporation of relative risk measures, such as those contained in the 
Consequence Equivalency Matrix, or quantitative economic based measures of mission 
outcomes as detailed in Chapter 4, are needed to provide important context to high-level 
statements of mission priorities and enable them to be further disaggregated and applied at 
local levels. 
Perhaps the most formidable challenge facing the new standard operational planning process is 
the impending clash of organizational cultures associated with how the various operational 
resource types are managed.  Historically, Coast Guard aircraft have been centrally managed 
due to their high cost of operation, need for standardization, and regulatory and safety 
considerations associated with operating aircraft.  This is contrasted by the small-boat 
community which has traditionally been managed in a more distributed or decentralized 
fashion.  Although significant progress has been made to centrally acquire small-boats and 
standardize their training and material configuration, small-boats, by the nature of their 
primary missions, have a higher percentage of un-programmed operating time.  Managing 
disparate resource types under the same operational planning process will result in, or at least 
should force, shifts in organizational sub-cultures.  For example, organizational and budgetary 
pressures to operate existing small-boats more efficiently will likely drive the percentage of un-
programmed operating time down, requiring resource managers to plan operations further in 
advance or endure administrative approval processes to operate resources above planned 
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levels in response to higher than expected resource demands.  Over time, these pressures may 
be sufficient to shift small-boat management practices away from a traditional “fire-house” 
model (i.e. emergency response resources held in reserve for the next emergency response) 
toward a “police on patrol” model (i.e. fewer emergency resources held in reserve; patrolling 
resources are diverted to higher priority missions). 
Building on the challenge presented by shifting organizational sub-cultures, the new 
operational planning process now encompasses planning efforts for missions that traditionally 
have not relied on cutters, aircraft, or small-boats.  Instead, these missions rely on the efforts of 
individuals, or teams of individuals, to achieve performance outcomes.  Up to this point, the 
operational planning processes have focused on managing operating platforms or teams of 
individuals that act like an operational platform (e.g. a law enforcement team that deploys 
onboard an allied vessel for counter-drug operations).  Planning the efforts of individuals 
responsible for performing mission outcomes (e.g. a marine inspector verifying a vessel’s 
compliance with construction standards) can potentially increase the complexity of planning 
efforts by an order of magnitude.  A deliberate process to identify which job positions or 
occupational specialties that need to be tracked at an individual level is required. 
The final challenge facing the operational planning process is the inconsistent interpretation of 
functional job responsibilities.  More specifically, how are trade-offs between competing 
mission demands to be handled.  I interviewed six individuals directly involved in the 
operational planning process at all levels of the operational chain of command.  Interviewees at 
two of the organizational levels viewed their role in resolving disputes between competing 
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mission areas as one of “coordination”.  If two or more mission areas were competing for the 
same resources, the operational planning staffs viewed their role as bringing this conflict to the 
attention of the affected mission program managers with the expectation that the mission 
program managers would resolve the dispute.  At the other end of the spectrum, a more 
authoritative approach was favored.  Interviewees at the other two organizational levels 
assumed a more active role for themselves and recommended, or even determined, a 
resolution.  These two interpretations of the planning staff’s role are important.  They reflect 
different interpretations of how organizational power and authority should work.  The first 
more passive approach reflects the traditional role of planning personnel relative to the 
historically powerful program managers.  The second more activist and empowered approach 
reflects the increased organizational emphasis on operational planning and a view that planning 
staffs are perhaps better positioned than individual program managers to develop objective 
and unbiased solutions to resource management issues that span multiple missions.  I don’t 
believe that either interpretation is correct for all situations.  I do believe, however, that 
operational commanders should make a deliberate decision regarding how cross-mission issues 
are to be resolved and resource the affected staff accordingly.  Regardless of whether planning 
staffs perform in a coordination or authoritative capacity, one tool that will help cross-mission 
communication and possibly resolve issues before they occur is use of objective criteria for 
determining relative mission outcome values.  This is where the mission outcome values 
outlined in Chapter 4 may be of use. 
  
110 
 
Chapter 8: Conclusions 
 
“To succeed, jump as quickly at opportunities as you do at conclusions.” 
Benjamin Franklin, 1706-1790 
 
As indicated in the title, this thesis is but the first in a series of steps needed to better 
understand the public service value delivered by a multi-mission organization and the potential 
opportunities that are available with a more complete understanding of the relative, or 
absolute, trade-offs associated with apportioning scarce resources between those missions.  
There are several areas which warrant further work and research.  First, I was unable to 
establish the public service value associated with four of the Coast Guard’s eleven mission 
areas.  This shortfall can be partially overcome by updating the relative risk rankings of the 
Consequence Equivalency Matrix, discussed in Chapter 4, and combining these with the 
absolute mission outcome values established for the other seven mission areas.  Updating the 
Consequence Equivalency Matrix with the absolute missions outcome values will not only 
reinforce the validity of the relative risk rankings, but will allow more reliable relative risk 
rankings to be developed for the remaining four mission area performance outcomes until 
independently developed analysis can be developed and/or located. 
Additional work is also needed to better quantify the linkages between resources and mission 
outcomes.  The mission performance outcome values contained in Table 4-21, as well as the 
Consequence Equivalency Matrix, can provide valuable information and a broader perspective 
to operational commanders and their planning staffs.  An objective and quantitative basis of 
comparison is a powerful tool that can help clarify and guide complex resource apportionment 
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decisions in a multi-mission environment.  However, simply providing a listing of absolute or 
relative mission performance outcome values is not sufficient.  Improved projections of mission 
threats and understanding of how specific resource capabilities perform in a variety of mission 
threat scenarios are needed to truly capitalize on the benefits of understanding cross-mission 
trade-offs.  In addition, the marginal mission outcome impact associated with incremental 
changes in mission resources must be better quantified.  To answer the question, “What do I 
expect to gain and at what cost?”  is very difficult to quantify.  But an efficient and effective 
multi-mission resource management process must try to answer just that question as 
objectively as possible. 
The most important lesson that I learned from this research, however, relates to the 
communication of strategic intent.  The value of communicating strategic intent does not reside 
in the aspects of who, what, where, or when.  The value of communicating strategic intent 
resides in communicating the why.  Why the Coast Guard should invest limited funds to develop 
one capability over another.  Why resources are apportioned to one mission instead of another.  
Why assets are targeted in one geographic region instead of another.  Why cutter crews endure 
prolonged separation from family in order to patrol a far off quadrant of the ocean or why air-
crews and boat-crews need to brave the elements just one last time in the hopes they locate 
the overdue fishing vessel.  Understanding cross-mission trade-offs enables leaders to 
communicate the why and it enables those who are called to perform to understand why. 
 
112 
 
Coast Guard personnel understand that they are the who, their job is the what, where is where-
ever duty calls, and when is whenever there is a need.  They do however need to understand 
the why.  Why provides alignment that transcends simple chains of command and mechanical 
resource management practices.  The why provides the inspiration and motivation that enables 
ordinary people to achieve extraordinary results.  Semper Paratus 
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Appendix A: Coast Guard Platforms and Units 
Asset Asset Description Typical Missions 
 
378’ High Endurance Cutter; 
operates far offshore 
including overseas 
deployments 
 
# in service: 12 
Counter Drug, Illegal 
Migration, Homeland Security, 
Living Marine Resources, 
Defense Operations, Search 
and Rescue 
 
270’ Medium Endurance 
Cutter; operates near to far 
offshore 
 
# in service: 13 
Counter Drug, Illegal 
Migration, Homeland Security, 
Living Marine Resources, 
Defense Operations, Search 
and Rescue 
 
210’ Medium Endurance 
Cutter; operates near to far 
offshore 
 
# in service: 15 
Counter Drug, Illegal 
Migration, Homeland Security, 
Living Marine Resources, 
Search and Rescue 
 
110’ Patrol Boat; operates 
near to far offshore 
 
# in service: 45 
Counter Drug, Illegal 
Migration, Homeland Security, 
Living Marine Resources, 
Search and Rescue 
 
87’ Patrol Boat; operates near 
shore 
 
# in service: 66 
Counter Drug, Illegal 
Migration, Homeland Security, 
Living Marine Resources, 
Search and Rescue 
 
225’ Ocean Going Buoy 
Tender; operates near shore, 
occasionally deployed 
overseas 
 
# in service: 16 
Aids to Navigation, Illegal 
Migration, Homeland Security, 
Ice Breaking, Search and 
Rescue 
 
175’ Coastal Buoy Tender; 
operates near shore 
 
# in service: 14 
Aids to Navigation, Illegal 
Migration, Homeland Security, 
Search and Rescue 
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140’ Harbor Tug; operates in 
harbors and near shore 
 
# in service: 9 
Ice Breaking, Homeland 
Security, Living Marine 
Resources, Search and Rescue 
 
65’ Harbor Tug; operates in 
harbors 
 
# in service: 11 
Ice Breaking, Homeland 
Security, Search and Rescue, 
Aids to Navigation 
 
47’ Motor Life Boat; operates 
in harbors and near shore (up 
to 50 miles offshore)  
 
# in service: 117 
Search and Rescue, Homeland 
Security, Living Marine 
Resources 
 
41’ Utility Boat; operates in 
harbors and near shore (up to 
25 miles offshore)  
 
# in service: 172 
Search and Rescue, Homeland 
Security, Living Marine 
Resources 
 
25’ Response Boat; operates 
in harbors and near shore (up 
to 10 miles offshore)  
 
# in service: 457 
Homeland Security, Search 
and Rescue, Living Marine 
Resources 
 
HC-130 Airplane 
 
# in service: 27 
Search and Rescue, Counter 
Drug, Illegal Immigration, 
Homeland Security, Living 
Marine Resources 
 
HU-25 Airplane 
 
# in service: 41 
Search and Rescue, Counter 
Drug, Illegal Immigration, 
Homeland Security, Living 
Marine Resources 
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HH-60 Helicopter 
 
# in service: 42 
Search and Rescue, Counter 
Drug, Illegal Immigration, 
Homeland Security, Living 
Marine Resources 
 
HH-65 Helicopter 
 
# in service: 94 
Search and Rescue, Counter 
Drug, Illegal Immigration, 
Homeland Security, Living 
Marine Resources 
 
Coast Guard Command 
Centers; operate 7X24 
managing Coast Guard 
operations; local, regional, 
and national focus 
 
# in service: 50 
Search and Rescue, 
Environmental Response and 
Protection, Counter Drug, 
Illegal Migration, Homeland 
Security, Living Marine 
Resources 
 Coast Guard Vessel Traffic 
Service Centers; operate 7X24 
managing commercial traffic 
in high traffic ports; local 
focus 
 
# in service: 10 
 
Mobility (Commercial Traffic 
Management) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Nationwide Differential 
Global Positioning System 
(DGPS) provides continuous 
GPS correction signals 
throughout the U.S. enabling 
real-time positional errors of 
3-10 meters (compared to 30-
100 meters available thru 
standard GPS); provided free 
to anyone with a DGPS 
receiver. 
Mobility; interagency project 
performed in conjunction with 
the Dept of Defense, Federal 
Highways Administration, and 
Federal Railroads 
Administration 
 
More than 50,000 short range 
aids to navigation include 
navigational buoys, 
automated fog signals, 
navigational range lights, and 
lighthouse beacons 
Mobility, Marine Safety, 
Search and Rescue 
 
  
116 
 
Appendix B: Principles of Coast Guard Operations 
 
This overview of principles of Coast Guard Operations was excerpted from Publication 1, U.S. 
Coast Guard: America’s Maritime Guardian. 
 
Clear Objective: Direct every operation toward a clearly defined and attainable objective. The 
most significant action a leader can take in planning and executing an operation is to clearly 
express the overarching objective to subordinates. 
 
Effective Presence: At the most basic level, effective presence means having the right assets and 
capabilities at the right place at the right time.  
 
Ensuring an effective presence also requires careful attention to the ability to sustain our assets 
during normal operations. 
 
A key component of effective presence is acceptable presence, which refers to the reality that 
foreign governments and nonstate actors oftentimes regard Coast Guard forces as less 
threatening or objectionable than those of the other U.S. armed services. 
 
Unity of Effort: Most Coast Guard operations are performed by cooperative effort among a 
number of different units, or by the Coast Guard working in concert with and coordinating the 
efforts of a diverse set of governmental and non-governmental entities, to achieve the 
operational objective. 
 
The concept known as the “chain of command” is an essential element to achieving internal 
unity of effort… Respect for the chain of command, especially when coupled with proper staff 
coordination, contributes significantly to internal unity of effort. 
 
Unity among organizations is the external counterpart to internal unity of effort. This external 
leadership challenge is in many respects the more demanding, because the external entities we 
deal with generally are not under the Coast Guard’s authority and discerning those 
organizations’ lines of authority may be problematic… The Coast Guard does not have the final 
authority in all situations and when necessary refers decisions to the appropriate level. 
 
On-Scene Initiative: The nature of our operations demands that Coast Guard men and women 
be given latitude to act quickly and decisively within the scope of their authority, without 
waiting for direction from higher levels in the chain of command… the concept of allowing the 
person on scene to take the initiative—guided by a firm understanding of the desired tactical 
objectives and the national interests at stake—remains central to the Coast Guard’s view of its 
command relationships.  Our ethos is that the person on scene can be depended upon to assess 
the situation, seize the initiative, and take the action necessary for success. 
 
Decisive action requires unity of effort— getting all parts of a force to work together. Rapid 
action, on the other hand, requires a large degree of decentralization, giving those closest to the 
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problem the freedom to solve it. To reconcile these seemingly contradictory requirements, we 
use tools called the “commander’s intent” and “concept of operations.” The commander’s intent 
conveys the objective and the desired course of action. The concept of operations details the 
commander’s estimated sequence of actions to achieve the objective and contains essential 
elements of a plan—i.e., what is to be done and how the commander plans to do it. A significant 
change in the situation that requires action will alter the concept of operations, but the 
commander’s intent is overarching and usually remains unchanged. 
 
Flexibility: This principle is the operational corollary to our multi-mission character. Arising from 
a combination of broad authority, diverse responsibilities, and limited resources, the principle 
means that if we are to succeed in pursuing multiple missions with the same people and assets, 
we must be able to adjust to a wide variety of tasks and circumstances. This notion of flexibility 
also is deeply embedded in our heritage of semper paratus. We built our reputation for being 
“always ready” to meet just about any maritime challenge by successfully and repeatedly 
adapting to the situation at hand. The most demanding circumstances today require the Coast 
Guard to conduct “surge operations”—high-intensity efforts usually launched at short notice in 
response to an emergency situation. 
 
Managed Risk: Just as the unity of effort principle has internal and external dimensions, so too 
the principle of managed risk operates at two levels. The internal aspect of this principle 
involves the commander’s obligations to ensure the unit is properly trained, equipped, and 
maintained for the mission and to carefully assess crew and equipment capabilities against the 
operational scenario when assessing whether and how to execute a given mission. 
 
Preparation alone, however, is not enough. Success also requires that our people and equipment 
be used within the limits of their abilities…. Responsible commanders evaluate the capability of 
crew and equipment against the conditions likely to be encountered when deciding on the 
proper course of action. Conscious attention to time-tested and time-honored principles of safe 
operation is a necessity. 
The idea of managing risks is not limited to Coast Guard response operations. In fact, risk 
management through prevention (to reduce the probability of an adverse event) and response 
(to minimize consequences when an adverse event does occur) has long been a fundamental 
aspect of Coast Guard operations… prevention and response activities, while focused on 
different aspects of the same problem, are inextricably linked. Neither is superior to the other 
and neither is adequate by itself. More importantly, the Coast Guard’s overall effectiveness 
depends on the synergy between these two very different means of achieving success: our 
operational strengths in the response arena make us more effective in the prevention arena, 
and vice versa. Prevention and response are both essential tools for Coast Guard success. 
 
Restraint: Coast Guard personnel have always been under a special obligation to exercise their 
powers prudently and with restraint. Title 14 of the U.S. Code, Section 89, confers on Coast 
Guard personnel an unparalleled level of law enforcement authority.  
A lack of restraint in Coast Guard operations, then, would be inconsistent with one of the 
fundamental and longstanding practices of the Service, as well as potentially violating the 
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constitutional protections afforded American citizens. Restraint extends beyond how Coast 
Guard personnel treat American citizens—it also covers how we treat the foreign citizens with 
whom we come into contact. As the cutting edge of U.S. maritime law enforcement, the Coast 
Guard must also exercise restraint when dealing with the illegal acts by foreign vessels and their 
crews. We have a duty to enforce U.S. sovereignty, but in a manner that does honor to the 
Constitution we took an oath to uphold. 
  
119 
 
Appendix C: Principles of War 
 
This overview of Principles of War was excerpted from Publication 1, U.S. Coast Guard: 
America’s Maritime Guardian, Appendix B and Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine For Joint 
Operations (1995). 
 
 
As a member of the U.S. Armed Forces, the principles of war also apply to the Coast Guard, 
particularly when we engage in joint military operations with the Navy and the other armed 
services. Like the broader principles to which the Service adheres, these principles do not 
constitute a checklist that should be memorized. Rather, they provide a framework for thinking 
about the requirements of warfare and, when taken out of the context of combat, other types 
operations as well. The principles are as follows: 
Objective. The purpose of the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly 
defined, decisive, and attainable objective. The objective of combat operations is the destruction 
of the enemy armed forces’ capability and will to fight. The objective of an operation other than 
war might be more difficult to define; nevertheless, it too must be clear from the beginning. 
Objective must directly, quickly, and economically contribute to the purpose of the operation. 
Each operation must contribute to strategic objectives. Avoid actions that do not directly 
contribute to achieving the objective. 
Mass. The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the place and time 
to achieve decisive results. To achieve mass is to synchronize appropriate joint force capabilities 
where they will have a decisive effect in a short period of time. Mass must be sustained to have 
the desired effect. Massing effects, rather than concentrating forces, can enable even 
numerically inferior forces to achieve decisive results and minimize human losses and waste of 
resources. 
Maneuver. The purpose of maneuver is to place the enemy in a position of disadvantage 
through the flexible application of combat power. Maneuver is the movement of forces in 
relation to the enemy to secure or retain positional advantage, usually in order to deliver—or 
threaten delivery of—the direct and indirect fires of the maneuvering force. Effective maneuver 
keeps the enemy off balance and thus protects the friendly force. It contributes materially in 
exploiting successes, preserving freedom of action, and reducing vulnerability by continually 
posing new problems for the enemy. 
Offensive. The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. 
Offensive action is the most effective and decisive way to attain a clearly defined objective. 
Offensive operations are the means by which a military force seizes and holds the initiative 
while maintaining freedom of action and achieving decisive results. The importance of offensive 
action is fundamentally true across all levels of war. 
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Economy of Force. The purpose of the economy of force is to allocate minimum essential 
combat power to secondary efforts. Economy of force is the judicious employment and 
distribution of forces. It is the measured allocation of available combat power to such tasks as 
limited attacks, defense, delays, or deception in order to achieve mass elsewhere at the decisive 
point and time. 
Unity of Command. The purpose of unity of command is to ensure unity of effort for every 
objective under one responsible commander for every objective. Unity of command means that 
all forces operate under a single commander with the requisite authority to direct all forces 
employed in pursuit of a common purpose. Unity of effort, however, requires coordination and 
cooperation among all forces toward a commonly recognized objective, although they are not 
necessarily part of the same command structure. In multi-national and interagency operations, 
unity of command may not be possible, but the requirement for unity of effort becomes 
paramount. Unity of effort— coordination through cooperation and common interests—is an 
essential complement to unity of command. 
Simplicity. The purpose of simplicity is to prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and concise orders 
to ensure thorough understanding. Simplicity contributes to successful operations. Simple plans 
and clear, concise orders minimize misunderstanding and confusion. When other factors are 
equal, the simplest plan is preferable. Simplicity in plans allows better understanding and 
execution planning at all echelons. Simplicity and clarity of expression greatly facilitate mission 
execution in the stress, fatigue, and other complexities of modern combat and are especially 
critical to success in combined operations. 
Surprise. The purpose of surprise is to strike the enemy at a time or place in a manner for which 
it is unprepared. Surprise can help the commander shift the balance of combat power and thus 
achieve success well out of proportion to the effort expended. Factors contributing to surprise 
include speed in decision making, information sharing, and force movement; effective 
intelligence; deception; application of unexpected combat power; operations security; and 
variations in tactics and methods of operation. 
Security. The purpose of security is to never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected 
advantage. Security enhances freedom of action by reducing our vulnerability to hostile acts, 
influence, or surprise. Security results from the measures taken by commanders to protect their 
forces. Staff planning and an understanding of enemy strategy, tactics, and doctrine will 
enhance security. Risk is inherent in military operations. Application of this principle includes 
prudent risk management, not undue caution. Protecting the force increases our combat power 
and preserves freedom of action. 
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Appendix D: Example Operational Campaign Plan 
 
The following information was excerpted from the Coast Guard’s strategic plan for the Living 
Marine Resources Mission entitled Ocean Guardian (2004). 
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Interagency Linkages: 
 Future state outline: Fisheries regulations become more complex in order to balance 10 
National Standards4, respond to court orders as a result of litigation, or become more 
comprehensive as part of an ecosystem management scheme; 
 More areas of the oceans will be managed by marine protected areas; 
 International emphasis on high seas fisheries management will increase, in areas such as 
regional fisheries management organizations, Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported (IUU) 
fishing, deep sea trawling, and sea mount fisheries; 
 Domestic fishing effort is reduced, either through vessel buy-back programs or 
management schemes that limit effort such as days-at-sea or Individual Fishing Quotas 
(IFQs); 
 Relatively well managed fish stocks in the U.S. EEZ will provide an enticing target for distant 
water foreign fishers as worldwide demand for fish increases and opportunities to fish in 
the EEZs of other nations decrease; 
 Coast Guard capabilities and capacities, such as maritime domain awareness, will improve 
due to homeland security funding; resulting in improved fisheries enforcement ability; and 
 Recommendations from the 2003 Pew Ocean Commission and 2004 Commission on Ocean 
Policy reports result in dynamic changes to fisheries management. 
 
                                                          
4
 Any fishery management plan prepared and any regulation promulgated to implement any such plan must be 
consistent with the 10 national standards defined in the Magnuson-Stevens Fisheries Conservation and 
Management Act, Public Law 94-265 as amended through October 11, 1996.   
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CG Implementation Concepts: 
Sound regulations: Fisheries management plans and associated regulations must be simple, 
enforceable and provide for safe fishing operations. 
Effective presence: Effective presence is the allocation of fisheries enforcement resources at 
levels that ensure adequate compliance with management measures implemented to recover 
and maintain healthy fish stocks.  Effective presence requires the maintenance of a threshold 
level of physical presence.   
Application of technology: The demand for Coast Guard fisheries enforcement services is 
growing, and the application of new technologies is necessary to meet the growing demands 
for fisheries enforcement.   
Productive partnerships: Productive partnerships with fisheries managers, the commercial and 
recreational fishing industry, and foreign, federal and state enforcement agencies are necessary 
to effectively enforce regulations and ensure compliance in a legitimate, highly regulated 
industry. 
 
The mission of the fisheries law enforcement program is to provide effective and professional 
at-sea enforcement to advance national goals for the conservation and management of living 
marine resources and their environment.   
These goals are listed in rank order, with the purpose and importance of the goal, standards to 
define program requirements, and strategies to achieve the goal provided. 
Goal 1:  Prevent illegal encroachment of the U.S. Exclusive Economic Zone by foreign fishing 
vessels  Every EEZ incursion marks a breakdown in the integrity of our maritime borders and 
a potential threat to our nation’s security.  Each incursion also represents a threat to our 
Nation’s fisheries resources and a theft from our economy. 
Standards for preventing illegal encroachment of the U.S. EEZ by foreign fishing vessels are:   
 Respond to all known incidents of illegal encroachment in progress;  
 Based on threat assessments, sufficiently surveil high threat areas to detect all vessels 
engaged in or suspected of illegal encroachment; 
 Intercept 100% of known suspects; and  
 Properly document every known violation discovered, and take appropriate action. 
 
The Coast Guard patrols the EEZ boundary areas to neutralize the threat of foreign poaching of 
U.S. fisheries resources.  As worldwide fish stocks decline, incentive increases among foreign 
fishers to poach relatively well-managed U.S. fish stocks.  Although foreign encroachment can 
occur anywhere in the 3.36 million square mile EEZ, it is most likely to occur where high-value 
or high quantity fisheries are found.  Consistently over the years, the following areas in priority 
order have met those criteria:   
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 Bering Sea along the U.S.-Russia Maritime Boundary Line; 
 Central and Western Pacific around Hawaii and outlying U.S. territories; 
 U.S./Mexico maritime border in the Gulf of Mexico; and 
 U.S./Canadian maritime boundaries, especially in the following locations: 
o Straits of Juan de Fuca and Puget Sound  
o Dixon Entrance 
o Hague Line  
o Great Lakes 
 
Goal 2:  Effectively enforce federal regulations that provide stewardship of living marine 
resources and their environments  Healthy domestic fisheries stocks and marine ecosystems 
are important to our Nation’s continued vitality, and effective enforcement of domestic 
fisheries regulations is critical to maintaining the health of these stocks and marine ecosystems. 
Standards to effectively enforce federal regulations that provide stewardship of living marine 
resources and their environments are:   
 Respond to all known significant violations5 in progress;   
 Based on threat assessments, sufficiently surveil high threat areas of the EEZ to detect 
80% of all significant violations, or suspected significant violations, of domestic living 
marine resource laws and regulations;  
 Based on threat assessments, sufficiently surveil low threat areas of the EEZ to detect 
20% of all significant violations, or suspected significant violations, of domestic living 
marine resource laws and regulations;  
 Intercept 100% of known suspects;  
 Properly document every known significant violation of domestic living marine resource 
laws and regulations discovered, and take appropriate action;  
 Annually board 20% of the U.S. fishing fleet operating in high threat areas to promote 
compliance with domestic living marine resource laws and regulations;  
 Annually board 10% of the U.S. fishing fleet operating in low threat areas to promote 
compliance with domestic living marine resource laws and regulations; and  
 Support all legitimate requests for Living Marine Resource (LMR) enforcement 
assistance by appropriate agencies. 
To provide effective enforcement, the Coast Guard will focus enforcement efforts on significant 
violations.   
                                                          
5 A significant violation is a domestic or international living marine resource violation which results in one or more 
of the following conditions: (1) Significant damage/impact to the resource/fisheries management plan; (2) 
Significant monetary advantage to the violator over his/her competitor; and/or (3) High regional or national 
interest. 
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Goal 3:  Ensure compliance with international agreements for the management of living marine 
resources  According to the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, 75% of the 
world’s major marine fish stocks are fully exploited, overexploited, or significantly depleted6.  
Although many international enforcement schemes already exist, they require enforcement 
and the demonstration of U.S. commitment as a leader in the protection of the marine 
environment and the conservation of fish and marine protected species. 
Standards to ensure compliance with international agreements for the management of living 
marine resources are:   
 Respond to all known violations in progress;  
 Based on threat assessments, sufficiently surveil high threat areas to detect 80% of all 
vessels engaged in or suspected of violating international agreements;  
 Intercept 100% of known suspects; 
 Properly document and take appropriate law enforcement action, as authorized by the 
terms of the applicable international agreement and flag state, for each suspect 
intercepted; and  
 Ensure the development of viable enforcement schemes designed to protect, conserve 
and manage living marine resources. 
 
The Coast Guard partners closely with NOAA Fisheries and the Department of State to develop 
enforceable international agreements, and provides valuable enforcement advice to 
international fisheries delegations.  The Coast Guard will also partner with international 
fisheries enforcement agencies to share information and coordinate effective enforcement.   
  
                                                          
6
 “State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2002”, FAO Fisheries Department, pg 23. 
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Appendix E: Coast Guard Standard Operational Planning Process 
Interview Questionnaire 
============================================================================================= 
Name:      Org:      Date: 
Non-attribution session; if you so choose, I will abstract any identifying information so your input can 
not be directly linked back to you. 
1. What is your job?  What role do you play in the operational planning process? 
2. How would you characterize your understanding of SOPP responsibilities for your level of the 
organization?    Thorough, working, minimal, what’s an SOPP? 
3. How would you characterize your understanding of SOPP responsibilities for the organizational 
levels immediately above/below you? Thorough, working, minimal, who do I work for/who 
works for me? 
4. How would you characterize your understanding of SOPP responsibilities for the organizational 
levels twice removed from you?  Thorough, working, minimal, who do I work for/who 
works for me? 
5. Who is your customer?  Who is your direct customer?  Who is the final beneficiary of your 
work?  Who are you the customer of? 
6. As the interpreter/disaggregator of guidance flowing down the chain of command btwn the 
programs&Area/ HQ&Districts/Area&Sectors/District&Units, what aspects do you find most 
challenging?  What is easiest? 
7. As the interpreter/aggregator of results/feedback flowing up the chain of command btwn the 
programs&Area/ HQ&Districts/Area&Sectors/District&Units, what aspects do you find most 
challenging?  What is easiest? 
8. What level of information do you consider too broad to include in your operational planning 
process guidance?  What level of information is too narrow/specific? 
9. What does the current operational planning process do well?  Why? 
10. What does the current operational planning process do poorly? Why? 
11. Other than compliance with existing guidance (meet/fail to meet measures, ceilings), what 
discretion or information do you have to justify shifting resources between missions? 
12. How confident are you in the accuracy of the guidance or results that you receive? 
13. How confident are you in the accuracy of the guidance promulgated or the results reported by 
your office? 
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14. What actions are available to you if you strongly disagree with guidance received or results 
reported?  How do you resolve differences of opinion? 
15. When, in an operational planning process context, is it justifiable for you to jump the chain of 
command (either up or down)? 
16. In your opinion, what are the biggest strengths (and weaknesses) of the current operational 
planning process? 
17. Under what situation would SOPP guidance state that performing at a level that is less than the 
performance goal is acceptable? 
18. How is the SOPP integrated with other strategic, budget, crisis action, and contingency-related 
planning efforts? 
19. If you could assign yourself to any level in the SOPP process, which would you choose and why?  
Which level would you avoid at all costs? 
20. What is the single most important or highest priority guidance you receive thru the SOPP? 
21. What single piece of information, process change, or tool would allow you to do your job 
better? 
22. If all priorities are “base-lined” at previously unattainable goals… where are the tradeoffs? 
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